13 ideas
| 2572 | Logical truth seems much less likely to 'correspond to the facts' than factual truth does [Haack] |
| 2570 | The same sentence could be true in one language and meaningless in another, so truth is language-relative [Haack] |
| 17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
| 17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
| 11022 | Gentzen introduced a natural deduction calculus (NK) in 1934 [Gentzen, by Read] |
| 11065 | The inferential role of a logical constant constitutes its meaning [Gentzen, by Hanna] |
| 11023 | The logical connectives are 'defined' by their introduction rules [Gentzen] |
| 11213 | Each logical symbol has an 'introduction' rule to define it, and hence an 'elimination' rule [Gentzen] |
| 17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
| 17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
| 17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
| 17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
| 10067 | Gentzen proved the consistency of arithmetic from assumptions beyond arithmetic [Gentzen, by Musgrave] |