11 ideas
2572 | Logical truth seems much less likely to 'correspond to the facts' than factual truth does [Haack] |
2570 | The same sentence could be true in one language and meaningless in another, so truth is language-relative [Haack] |
17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
22485 | Non-cognitivists give the conditions of use of moral sentences as facts about the speaker [Foot] |
22486 | The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings [Foot] |
22487 | Moral arguments are grounded in human facts [Foot] |