Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Question of Absolute Undecidability', 'Nonexistent Objects' and 'Attitudes De Dicto and De Se'

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12 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
17884 Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner]
17893 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
17894 We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
17890 There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
17887 PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
17891 Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
18948 There is an object for every set of properties (some of which exist, and others don't) [Parsons,T, by Sawyer]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
18415 The actual world is just the world you are in [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
16392 A content is a property, and believing it is self-ascribing that property [Lewis, by Recanati]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
18416 Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties [Lewis, by Solomon]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
16390 Lewis's popular centred worlds approach gives an attitude an index of world, subject and time [Lewis, by Recanati]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
18418 A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever]