18 ideas
9184 | We can't presume that all interesting concepts can be analysed [Williamson] |
8996 | If if time is money then if time is not money then time is money then if if if time is not money... [Quine] |
8995 | Definition by words is determinate but relative; fixing contexts could make it absolute [Quine] |
17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
10064 | Quine quickly dismisses If-thenism [Quine, by Musgrave] |
20296 | Logic needs general conventions, but that needs logic to apply them to individual cases [Quine, by Rey] |
8998 | Claims that logic and mathematics are conventional are either empty, uninteresting, or false [Quine] |
8999 | Logic isn't conventional, because logic is needed to infer logic from conventions [Quine] |
9000 | If a convention cannot be communicated until after its adoption, what is its role? [Quine] |
17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
8994 | If analytic geometry identifies figures with arithmetical relations, logicism can include geometry [Quine] |
17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
8997 | There are four different possible conventional accounts of geometry [Quine] |
17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
9183 | Platonism claims that some true assertions have singular terms denoting abstractions, so abstractions exist [Williamson] |
8993 | If mathematics follows from definitions, then it is conventional, and part of logic [Quine] |