14 ideas
8378 | Philosophers usually learn science from each other, not from science [Russell] |
17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
8375 | 'Necessary' is a predicate of a propositional function, saying it is true for all values of its argument [Russell] |
9382 | Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge] |
4396 | The law of causality is a source of confusion, and should be dropped from philosophy [Russell] |
8376 | If causes are contiguous with events, only the last bit is relevant, or the event's timing is baffling [Russell] |
8380 | Striking a match causes its igniting, even if it sometimes doesn't work [Russell] |
8379 | In causal laws, 'events' must recur, so they have to be universals, not particulars [Russell] |
8381 | The constancy of scientific laws rests on differential equations, not on cause and effect [Russell] |