26 ideas
9376 | A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian] |
15842 | An ad hominem refutation is reasonable, if it uses the opponent's assumptions [Harte,V] |
17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
15841 | Mereology began as a nominalist revolt against the commitments of set theory [Harte,V] |
9375 | Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian] |
17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
15858 | Traditionally, the four elements are just what persists through change [Harte,V] |
15848 | Mereology treats constitution as a criterion of identity, as shown in the axiom of extensionality [Harte,V] |
15837 | What exactly is a 'sum', and what exactly is 'composition'? [Harte,V] |
15839 | If something is 'more than' the sum of its parts, is the extra thing another part, or not? [Harte,V] |
15838 | The problem with the term 'sum' is that it is singular [Harte,V] |
9369 | 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian] |
9367 | The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian] |
9373 | That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian] |
9380 | We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian] |
9384 | We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian] |
9374 | If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian] |
9378 | If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian] |
9377 | 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian] |
9372 | Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian] |
17721 | There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins] |
9368 | Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian] |