Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Question of Absolute Undecidability', 'Plato on Parts and Wholes' and 'The Trouble with Possible Worlds'

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19 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle [Lycan]
The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist [Lycan]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
An ad hominem refutation is reasonable, if it uses the opponent's assumptions [Harte,V]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner]
'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Mereology began as a nominalist revolt against the commitments of set theory [Harte,V]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Traditionally, the four elements are just what persists through change [Harte,V]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
Mereology treats constitution as a criterion of identity, as shown in the axiom of extensionality [Harte,V]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
What exactly is a 'sum', and what exactly is 'composition'? [Harte,V]
If something is 'more than' the sum of its parts, is the extra thing another part, or not? [Harte,V]
The problem with the term 'sum' is that it is singular [Harte,V]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events [Lycan]
Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties [Lycan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan]