Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Question of Absolute Undecidability', 'Intensions Revisited' and 'Epistemology'

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18 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
13591 Quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn [Quine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
17884 Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner]
17893 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
17894 We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
17890 There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
17887 PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
17891 Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
13590 Essences can make sense in a particular context or enquiry, as the most basic predicates [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
8483 Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry [Quine]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
13589 Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism [Quine]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
13588 A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits [Quine]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
13592 Beliefs can be ascribed to machines [Quine]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
7301 The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
7302 Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
7303 If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
7299 Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
7300 An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
7297 My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]