Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Question of Absolute Undecidability', 'Three Grades of Modal Involvement' and 'Mental Files in Flux'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


19 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner]
'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
A train of reasoning must be treated as all happening simultaneously [Recanati]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described [Quine, by Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Objects are the values of variables, so a referentially opaque context cannot be quantified into [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves [Quine]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
Indexicality is not just a feature of language; examples show it also occurs in thought [Recanati]
How can we communicate indexical thoughts to people not in the right context? [Recanati]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Mental files are concepts, which are either collections or (better) containers [Recanati]
The Frege case of believing a thing is both F and not-F is explained by separate mental files [Recanati]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
A linguistic expression refers to what its associated mental file refers to [Recanati]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
There are speakers' thoughts and hearers' thoughts, but no further thought attached to the utterance [Recanati]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
The Naive view of communication is that hearers acquire exactly the thoughts of the speaker [Recanati]