Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Question of Absolute Undecidability', 'Reference and Modality' and 'The Science of Knowing (Wissenschaftslehre) [1st ed]'

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28 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
22024 Fichte's subjectivity struggles to then give any account of objectivity [Pinkard on Fichte]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
10928 Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely [Quine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
17884 Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner]
17893 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
22017 Normativity needs the possibility of negation, in affirmation and denial [Fichte, by Pinkard]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
10925 Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
10926 Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
17894 We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
17890 There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
17887 PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
17891 Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
10930 Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14645 To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
9201 Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K]
10927 Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
22018 Necessary truths derive from basic assertion and negation [Fichte, by Pinkard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
9203 We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Quine, by Fine,K]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
22064 Fichte's logic is much too narrow, and doesn't deduce ethics, art, society or life [Schlegel,F on Fichte]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
22032 Fichte's key claim was that the subjective-objective distinction must itself be subjective [Fichte, by Pinkard]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / a. Other minds
22020 We only see ourselves as self-conscious and rational in relation to other rationalities [Fichte]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
22060 The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge [Fichte, by Siep]
22066 Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte]
22016 The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity [Fichte, by Pinkard]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
22019 Consciousness of an object always entails awareness of the self [Fichte]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
22061 Judgement is distinguishing concepts, and seeing their relations [Fichte, by Siep]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
22023 Fichte's idea of spontaneity implied that nothing counts unless we give it status [Fichte, by Pinkard]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
22065 Fichte reduces nature to a lifeless immobility [Schlegel,F on Fichte]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
10931 We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine]