Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Question of Absolute Undecidability', 'Reference and Modality' and 'Essays on Active Powers 1: Active power'

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25 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
10928 Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely [Quine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
17884 Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner]
17893 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
10925 Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
10926 Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
17894 We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
17890 There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
17887 PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
17891 Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
23664 Powers are quite distinct and simple, and so cannot be defined [Reid]
23669 Thinkers say that matter has intrinsic powers, but is also passive and acted upon [Reid]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
23666 It is obvious that there could not be a power without a subject which possesses it [Reid]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
10930 Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14645 To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
9201 Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K]
10927 Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
9203 We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Quine, by Fine,K]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
23665 Consciousness is the power of mind to know itself, and minds are grounded in powers [Reid]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
23668 Our own nature attributes free determinations to our own will [Reid]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
20051 Reid said that agent causation is a unique type of causation [Reid, by Stout,R]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
8383 Day and night are constantly conjoined, but they don't cause one another [Reid, by Crane]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
23667 Regular events don't imply a cause, without an innate conviction of universal causation [Reid]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
23670 Scientists don't know the cause of magnetism, and only discover its regulations [Reid]
23671 Laws are rules for effects, but these need a cause; rules of navigation don't navigate [Reid]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
10931 We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine]