150 ideas
| 2319 | Metaphysics is the clarification of the ontological relationships between different areas of thought [Kim] |
| 11283 | There is pure deductive reasoning, and explanatory demonstration reasoning [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 16841 | Good inference has mechanism, precision, scope, simplicity, fertility and background fit [Lipton] |
| 1672 | Maybe everything could be demonstrated, if demonstration can be reciprocal or circular [Aristotle] |
| 1684 | Two falsehoods can be contrary to one another [Aristotle] |
| 16854 | Contrary pairs entail contradictions; one member entails negation of the other [Lipton] |
| 12145 | Definitions are of what something is, and that is universal [Aristotle] |
| 12075 | An Aristotelian definition is causal [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 12384 | Definition by division needs predicates, which are well ordered and thorough [Aristotle] |
| 9066 | You can define objects by progressively identifying what is the same and what is different [Aristotle] |
| 12382 | What it is and why it is are the same; screening defines and explains an eclipse [Aristotle] |
| 1668 | An axiom is a principle which must be understood if one is to learn anything [Aristotle] |
| 12376 | Demonstrations by reductio assume excluded middle [Aristotle] |
| 12373 | Something holds universally when it is proved of an arbitrary and primitive case [Aristotle] |
| 12363 | Everything is either asserted or denied truly [Aristotle] |
| 13004 | Aristotle's axioms (unlike Euclid's) are assumptions awaiting proof [Aristotle, by Leibniz] |
| 12377 | Mathematics is concerned with forms, not with superficial properties [Aristotle] |
| 12372 | The essence of a triangle comes from the line, mentioned in any account of triangles [Aristotle] |
| 12369 | A unit is what is quantitatively indivisible [Aristotle] |
| 2317 | Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency [Kim, by PG] |
| 2310 | Supervenience is linked to dependence [Kim] |
| 2315 | Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts [Kim] |
| 2329 | Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal [Kim] |
| 18910 | To seek truth, study the real connections between subjects and attributes [Aristotle] |
| 2320 | Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents [Kim] |
| 1675 | Separate Forms aren't needed for logic, but universals (one holding of many) are essential [Aristotle] |
| 1677 | We can forget the Forms, as they are irrelevant, and not needed in giving demonstrations [Aristotle] |
| 1687 | Why are being terrestrial and a biped combined in the definition of man, but being literate and musical aren't? [Aristotle] |
| 1681 | Units are positionless substances, and points are substances with position [Aristotle] |
| 12146 | Definitions recognise essences, so are not themselves essences [Aristotle] |
| 17039 | The predicates of a thing's nature are necessary to it [Aristotle] |
| 11994 | Aristotelian essences are properties mentioned at the starting point of a science [Aristotle, by Kung] |
| 12381 | What is necessary cannot be otherwise [Aristotle] |
| 1690 | A stone travels upwards by a forced necessity, and downwards by natural necessity [Aristotle] |
| 12072 | For Aristotle knowledge is explanatory, involving understanding, and principles or causes [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 12073 | 'Episteme' means grasping causes, universal judgments, explanation, and teaching [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 12378 | The reason why is the key to knowledge [Aristotle] |
| 12364 | We understand a thing when we know its explanation and its necessity [Aristotle] |
| 12366 | We only understand something when we know its explanation [Aristotle] |
| 16814 | Understanding is not mysterious - it is just more knowledge, of causes [Lipton] |
| 12370 | Some understanding, of immediate items, is indemonstrable [Aristotle] |
| 1685 | No one has mere belief about something if they think it HAS to be true [Aristotle] |
| 1673 | Knowledge proceeds from principles, so it is hard to know if we know [Aristotle] |
| 12379 | You cannot understand anything through perception [Aristotle] |
| 16725 | Some knowledge is lost if you lose a sense, and there is no way the knowledge can be replaced [Aristotle] |
| 23309 | Aristotle's concepts of understanding and explanation mean he is not a pure empiricist [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 1693 | Animals may have some knowledge if they retain perception, but understanding requires reasons to be given [Aristotle] |
| 9067 | Many memories of the same item form a single experience [Aristotle] |
| 1671 | Sceptics say justification is an infinite regress, or it stops at the unknowable [Aristotle] |
| 16825 | How do we distinguish negative from irrelevant evidence, if both match the hypothesis? [Lipton] |
| 1670 | When you understand basics, you can't be persuaded to change your mind [Aristotle] |
| 530 | There are two contradictory arguments about everything [Kim] |
| 13314 | Protagoras says arguments on both sides are always equal [Kim, by Seneca] |
| 2065 | Not every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people [Plato on Kim] |
| 1550 | Why didn't Protagoras begin by saying "a tadpole is the measure of all things"? [Plato on Kim] |
| 16851 | The inference to observables and unobservables is almost the same, so why distinguish them? [Lipton] |
| 24068 | Demonstration is more than entailment, as the explanatory order must match the causal order [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
| 17310 | Aristotle gets asymmetric consequence from demonstration, which reflects real causal priority [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
| 21359 | Aristotle doesn't actually apply his theory of demonstration to his practical science [Leroi on Aristotle] |
| 1667 | Premises must be true, primitive and immediate, and prior to and explanatory of conclusions [Aristotle] |
| 12365 | We can know by demonstration, which is a scientific deduction leading to understanding [Aristotle] |
| 10918 | Demonstrative understanding rests on necessary features of the thing in itself [Aristotle] |
| 12374 | Demonstrations must be necessary, and that depends on the middle term [Aristotle] |
| 12148 | Demonstrations are syllogisms which give explanations [Aristotle] |
| 1679 | Universal demonstrations are about thought; particular demonstrations lead to perceptions [Aristotle] |
| 1680 | Demonstration is better with fewer presuppositions, and it is quicker if these are familiar [Aristotle] |
| 16799 | Inductive inference is not proof, but weighing evidence and probability [Lipton] |
| 16798 | We infer from evidence by working out what would explain that evidence [Lipton] |
| 1691 | Aim to get definitions of the primitive components, thus establishing the kind, and work towards the attributes [Aristotle] |
| 12371 | A demonstration is a deduction which proceeds from necessities [Aristotle] |
| 12147 | The principles of demonstrations are definitions [Aristotle] |
| 1674 | All demonstration is concerned with existence, axioms and properties [Aristotle] |
| 12383 | There must be definitions before demonstration is possible [Aristotle] |
| 16856 | It is more impressive that relativity predicted Mercury's orbit than if it had accommodated it [Lipton] |
| 16857 | Predictions are best for finding explanations, because mere accommodations can be fudged [Lipton] |
| 16827 | If we make a hypothesis about data, then a deduction, where does the hypothesis come from? [Lipton] |
| 16804 | Induction is repetition, instances, deduction, probability or causation [Lipton] |
| 1683 | We learn universals from many particulars [Aristotle] |
| 16823 | Standard induction does not allow for vertical inferences, to some unobservable lower level [Lipton] |
| 16800 | An inductive inference is underdetermined, by definition [Lipton] |
| 16858 | We can argue to support our beliefs, so induction will support induction, for believers in induction [Lipton] |
| 16832 | If something in ravens makes them black, it may be essential (definitive of ravens) [Lipton] |
| 16836 | My shoes are not white because they lack some black essence of ravens [Lipton] |
| 16831 | A theory may explain the blackness of a raven, but say nothing about the whiteness of shoes [Lipton] |
| 16833 | We can't turn non-black non-ravens into ravens, to test the theory [Lipton] |
| 16834 | To pick a suitable contrast to ravens, we need a hypothesis about their genes [Lipton] |
| 16801 | A hypothesis is confirmed if an unlikely prediction comes true [Lipton] |
| 16837 | Bayes involves 'prior' probabilities, 'likelihood', 'posterior' probability, and 'conditionalising' [Lipton] |
| 16839 | Explanation may be an important part of implementing Bayes's Theorem [Lipton] |
| 16802 | Bayes seems to rule out prior evidence, since that has a probability of one [Lipton] |
| 16803 | Bayes is too liberal, since any logical consequence of a hypothesis confirms it [Lipton] |
| 12380 | Universals are valuable because they make the explanations plain [Aristotle] |
| 12367 | What is most universal is furthest away, and the particulars are nearest [Aristotle] |
| 12385 | Are particulars explained more by universals, or by other particulars? [Aristotle] |
| 16850 | Explanation may describe induction, but may not show how it justifies, or leads to truth [Lipton] |
| 1689 | Explanation is of the status of a thing, inferences to it, initiation of change, and purpose [Aristotle] |
| 16807 | An explanation gives the reason the phenomenon occurred [Lipton] |
| 16808 | An explanation is what makes the unfamiliar familiar to us [Lipton] |
| 16806 | An explanation is what is added to knowledge to yield understanding [Lipton] |
| 16822 | Seaching for explanations is a good way to discover the structure of the world [Lipton] |
| 1686 | What we seek and understand are facts, reasons, existence, and identity [Aristotle] |
| 16816 | In 'contrastive' explanation there is a fact and a foil - why that fact, rather than this foil? [Lipton] |
| 16826 | With too many causes, find a suitable 'foil' for contrast, and the field narrows right down [Lipton] |
| 16811 | An explanation unifies a phenomenon with our account of other phenomena [Lipton] |
| 12357 | Explanation and generality are inseparable [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
| 16810 | Deduction explanation is too easy; any law at all will imply the facts - together with the facts! [Lipton] |
| 16829 | We reject deductive explanations if they don't explain, not if the deduction is bad [Lipton] |
| 16809 | Good explanations may involve no laws and no deductions [Lipton] |
| 16812 | An explanation shows why it was necessary that the effect occurred [Lipton] |
| 16846 | A cause may not be an explanation [Lipton] |
| 16813 | To explain is to give either the causal history, or the causal mechanism [Lipton] |
| 16815 | Mathematical and philosophical explanations are not causal [Lipton] |
| 16849 | Explanations may be easier to find than causes [Lipton] |
| 1669 | The foundation or source is stronger than the thing it causes [Aristotle] |
| 16848 | Causal inferences are clearest when we can manipulate things [Lipton] |
| 16842 | We want to know not just the cause, but how the cause operated [Lipton] |
| 16840 | To maximise probability, don't go beyond your data [Lipton] |
| 1678 | Universals give better explanations, because they are self-explanatory and primitive [Aristotle] |
| 16824 | Is Inference to the Best Explanation nothing more than inferring the likeliest cause? [Lipton] |
| 16817 | Best Explanation as a guide to inference is preferable to best standard explanations [Lipton] |
| 16818 | The 'likeliest' explanation is the best supported; the 'loveliest' gives the most understanding [Lipton] |
| 16819 | IBE is inferring that the best potential explanation is the actual explanation [Lipton] |
| 16820 | Finding the 'loveliest' potential explanation links truth to understanding [Lipton] |
| 16828 | IBE is not passive treatment of data, but involves feedback between theory and data search [Lipton] |
| 16844 | A contrasting difference is the cause if it offers the best explanation [Lipton] |
| 16853 | We select possible explanations for explanatory reasons, as well as choosing among them [Lipton] |
| 16821 | Must we only have one explanation, and must all the data be made relevant? [Lipton] |
| 16838 | Bayesians say best explanations build up an incoherent overall position [Lipton] |
| 16855 | The best theory is boring: compare 'all planets move elliptically' with 'most of them do' [Lipton] |
| 16852 | Best explanation can't be a guide to truth, because the truth must precede explanation [Lipton] |
| 2318 | Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes [Kim, by PG] |
| 2325 | It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality [Kim] |
| 9068 | Perception creates primitive immediate principles by building a series of firm concepts [Aristotle] |
| 9069 | A perception lodging in the soul creates a primitive universal, which becomes generalised [Aristotle] |
| 2324 | Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim] |
| 2314 | Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't [Kim] |
| 2313 | Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property [Kim] |
| 2328 | The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia [Kim] |
| 2309 | Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience [Kim] |
| 2311 | Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction [Kim] |
| 2308 | Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies [Kim] |
| 2322 | Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time [Kim] |
| 2327 | Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful [Kim] |
| 2323 | Emotions have both intentionality and qualia [Kim] |
| 9070 | We learn primitives and universals by induction from perceptions [Aristotle] |
| 12368 | Negation takes something away from something [Aristotle] |
| 1692 | If you shouldn't argue in metaphors, then you shouldn't try to define them either [Aristotle] |
| 12375 | Whatever holds of a kind intrinsically holds of it necessarily [Aristotle] |
| 16847 | Counterfactual causation makes causes necessary but not sufficient [Lipton] |
| 1688 | Properties must be proved, but not essence; but existents are not a kind, so existence isn't part of essence [Aristotle] |