Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Particulars in Particular Clothing', 'Value Theory' and 'Thought'

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44 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
3099 Inference is never a conscious process [Harman]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
3077 Reasoning might be defined in terms of its functional role, which is to produce knowledge [Harman]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
3092 If you believe that some of your beliefs are false, then at least one of your beliefs IS false [Harman]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
3093 Any two states are logically linked, by being entailed by their conjunction [Harman]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
3098 Deductive logic is the only logic there is [Harman]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
3094 You don't have to accept the conclusion of a valid argument [Harman]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
3081 A theory of truth in a language must involve a theory of logical form [Harman]
3080 Logical form is the part of a sentence structure which involves logical elements [Harman]
3084 Our underlying predicates represent words in the language, not universal concepts [Harman]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
18680 To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
18431 Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
3100 You have to reaffirm all your beliefs when you make a logical inference [Harman]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
3089 Only lack of imagination makes us think that 'cats are animals' is analytic [Harman]
3088 Analyticity is postulated because we can't imagine some things being true, but we may just lack imagination [Harman]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
3101 Memories are not just preserved, they are constantly reinferred [Harman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
3074 People's reasons for belief are rarely conscious [Harman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
3097 We don't distinguish between accepting, and accepting as evidence [Harman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
6369 In negative coherence theories, beliefs are prima facie justified, and don't need initial reasons [Harman, by Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
3096 Coherence avoids scepticism, because it doesn't rely on unprovable foundations [Harman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
3095 Induction is an attempt to increase the coherence of our explanations [Harman]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
3073 We see ourselves in the world as a map [Harman]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
3076 Defining dispositions is circular [Harman]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
3075 Could a cloud have a headache if its particles formed into the right pattern? [Harman]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
3086 Are there any meanings apart from in a language? [Harman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
3078 Speech acts, communication, representation and truth form a single theory [Harman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
3090 There is only similarity in meaning, never sameness in meaning [Harman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 9. Ambiguity
3082 Ambiguity is when different underlying truth-conditional structures have the same surface form [Harman]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
3079 Truth in a language is explained by how the structural elements of a sentence contribute to its truth conditions [Harman]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
3085 Sentences are different from propositions, since two sentences can express one proposition [Harman]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
3087 The analytic/synthetic distinction is a silly division of thought into encyclopaedia and dictionary [Harman]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
3083 Many predicates totally resist translation, so a universal underlying structure to languages is unlikely [Harman]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
18684 Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
18666 Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
18685 Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
18667 The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
18679 Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
18682 A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
18683 Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
18686 The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18672 Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18677 A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
18669 Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
18670 The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
18668 Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]