Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Particulars in Particular Clothing', 'Value Theory' and 'Equality'

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23 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
18680 To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
18431 Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
18684 Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
18666 Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
18685 Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
18667 The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
18679 Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
18682 A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
18683 Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
18686 The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18672 Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18677 A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
18669 Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
18670 The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
18668 Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
3282 The general form of moral reasoning is putting yourself in other people's shoes [Nagel]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / c. Difference principle
3278 An egalitarian system must give priority to those with the worst prospects in life [Nagel]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
3281 The ideal of acceptability to each individual underlies the appeal to equality [Nagel]
3275 Equality was once opposed to aristocracy, but now it opposes public utility and individual rights [Nagel]
3277 In judging disputes, should we use one standard, or those of each individual? [Nagel]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
3273 Equality nowadays is seen as political, social, legal and economic [Nagel]
3274 Equality can either be defended as good for society, or as good for individual rights [Nagel]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
3276 A morality of rights is very minimal, leaving a lot of human life without restrictions or duties [Nagel]