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All the ideas for 'Particulars in Particular Clothing', 'On Concept and Object' and 'De Re and De Dicto'

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18 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
4975 A thought can be split in many ways, so that different parts appear as subject or predicate [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
14650 Maybe proper names involve essentialism [Plantinga]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
14648 Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'? [Plantinga]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
9949 There is the concept, the object falling under it, and the extension (a set, which is also an object) [Frege, by George/Velleman]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
18995 Frege mistakenly takes existence to be a property of concepts, instead of being about things [Frege, by Yablo]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
10317 It is unclear whether Frege included qualities among his abstract objects [Frege, by Hale]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
18431 Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
10535 Frege's 'objects' are both the referents of proper names, and what predicates are true or false of [Frege, by Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
14647 Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
14646 An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it [Plantinga]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14649 Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition? [Plantinga]
14642 Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re' [Plantinga]
14643 'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
14651 What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? [Plantinga]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
9839 Frege equated the concepts under which an object falls with its properties [Frege, by Dummett]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
4973 As I understand it, a concept is the meaning of a grammatical predicate [Frege]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
9167 Frege felt that meanings must be public, so they are abstractions rather than mental entities [Frege, by Putnam]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
4974 For all the multiplicity of languages, mankind has a common stock of thoughts [Frege]