14 ideas
| 18889 | Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific [Salmon,N] |
| 9161 | Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H] |
| 14627 | S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Salmon,N, by Williamson] |
| 18431 | Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards] |
| 18888 | Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist [Salmon,N] |
| 9160 | Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H] |
| 9164 | We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H] |
| 9165 | Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H] |
| 9162 | Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H] |
| 9166 | People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H] |
| 9163 | If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H] |
| 18886 | Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles [Salmon,N] |
| 18887 | The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value [Salmon,N] |
| 18891 | Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different [Salmon,N] |