86 ideas
6928 | Only that which can be an object of religion is an object of philosophy [Feuerbach] |
6918 | Philosophy should not focus on names, but on the determined nature of things [Feuerbach] |
6904 | Modern philosophy begins with Descartes' abstraction from sensation and matter [Feuerbach] |
6931 | Empiricism is right about ideas, but forgets man himself as one of our objects [Feuerbach] |
6933 | The laws of reality are also the laws of thought [Feuerbach] |
3508 | Correspondence to the facts HAS to be the aim of enquiry [Searle] |
6919 | Absolute thought remains in another world from being [Feuerbach] |
19457 | Being is what is undetermined, and hence indistinguishable [Feuerbach] |
6920 | Being posits essence, and my essence is my being [Feuerbach] |
6921 | Particularity belongs to being, whereas generality belongs to thought [Feuerbach] |
6926 | The only true being is of the senses, perception, feeling and love [Feuerbach] |
3473 | Reduction can be of things, properties, ideas or causes [Searle] |
3532 | Solidity in a piston is integral to its structure, not supervenient [Maslin on Searle] |
3533 | Is supervenience just causality? [Searle, by Maslin] |
3454 | Reality is entirely particles in force fields [Searle] |
3471 | Some properties depend on components, others on their relations [Searle] |
3472 | Fully 'emergent' properties contradict our whole theory of causation [Searle] |
18431 | Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards] |
3490 | Beliefs only make sense as part of a network of other beliefs [Searle] |
3491 | Beliefs are part of a network, and also exist against a background [Searle] |
6908 | Consciousness is absolute reality, and everything exists through consciousness [Feuerbach] |
6932 | Ideas arise through communication, and reason is reached through community [Feuerbach] |
3482 | Perception is a function of expectation [Searle] |
6935 | In man the lowest senses of smell and taste elevate themselves to intellectual acts [Feuerbach] |
3493 | Memory is mainly a guide for current performance [Searle] |
3463 | We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds [Searle] |
3457 | Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation [Searle] |
3480 | We experience unity at an instant and across time [Searle] |
3479 | The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial [Searle] |
3470 | Conscious creatures seem able to discriminate better [Searle] |
3486 | Unconscious thoughts are those capable of causing conscious ones [Searle] |
3503 | Consciousness results directly from brain processes, not from some intermediary like information [Searle] |
3465 | Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it [Searle] |
3484 | Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality [Searle] |
3489 | Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background [Searle] |
3494 | Intentionality is defined in terms of representation [Searle] |
3481 | Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality [Searle] |
4088 | Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself [Searle] |
3467 | Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense [Searle] |
3483 | Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision [Searle] |
3468 | I cannot observe my own subjectivity [Searle] |
3469 | Mind and brain don't interact if they are the same [Searle] |
3487 | Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained [Searle] |
3458 | Mental states only relate to behaviour contingently, not necessarily [Searle] |
3485 | Wanting H2O only differs from wanting water in its mental component [Searle] |
3461 | Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference [Searle] |
3496 | A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese [Searle] |
3499 | Computation presupposes consciousness [Searle] |
3501 | If we are computers, who is the user? [Searle] |
3456 | Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property [Searle] |
3475 | Property dualism denies reductionism [Searle] |
3455 | Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling [Searle] |
3453 | Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism [Searle] |
3478 | Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant [Searle] |
3476 | Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect [Searle] |
3477 | If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism [Searle] |
3531 | Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston [Searle] |
3466 | Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories [Searle] |
3500 | Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition? [Searle] |
9317 | Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology [Searle, by Kriegel/Williford] |
3474 | If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain? [Searle] |
3497 | If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it [Searle] |
3462 | We don't postulate folk psychology, we experience it [Searle] |
3498 | Computation isn't a natural phenomenon, it is a way of seeing phenomena [Searle] |
3492 | Content is much more than just sentence meaning [Searle] |
3464 | There is no such thing as 'wide content' [Searle] |
3506 | We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent [Searle] |
6925 | The new philosophy thinks of the concrete in a concrete (not a abstract) manner [Feuerbach] |
3451 | Meaning is derived intentionality [Searle] |
3450 | Philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy of mind [Searle] |
3507 | Universal grammar doesn't help us explain anything [Searle] |
3495 | Shared Background makes translation possible, though variation makes it hard [Searle] |
6924 | Plotinus was ashamed to have a body [Feuerbach] |
3505 | The function of a heart depends on what we want it to do [Searle] |
6927 | If you love nothing, it doesn't matter whether something exists or not [Feuerbach] |
6934 | Man is not a particular being, like animals, but a universal being [Feuerbach] |
6936 | The essence of man is in community, but with distinct individuals [Feuerbach] |
3504 | Chemistry entirely explains plant behaviour [Searle] |
3502 | Mind involves fighting, fleeing, feeding and fornicating [Searle] |
3459 | You can only know the limits of knowledge if you know the other side of the limit [Searle] |
6913 | God's existence cannot be separated from essence and concept, which can only be thought as existing [Feuerbach] |
6903 | If God is only an object for man, then only the essence of man is revealed in God [Feuerbach] |
6923 | God is what man would like to be [Feuerbach] |
6911 | God is for us a mere empty idea, which we fill with our own ego and essence [Feuerbach] |
6902 | Catholicism concerns God in himself, Protestantism what God is for man [Feuerbach] |
6905 | Absolute idealism is the realized divine mind of Leibnizian theism [Feuerbach] |