39 ideas
3593 | The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M] |
3585 | Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict [Williams,M] |
3584 | Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence [Williams,M] |
3599 | Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe [Williams,M] |
4975 | A thought can be split in many ways, so that different parts appear as subject or predicate [Frege] |
9949 | There is the concept, the object falling under it, and the extension (a set, which is also an object) [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
18995 | Frege mistakenly takes existence to be a property of concepts, instead of being about things [Frege, by Yablo] |
10317 | It is unclear whether Frege included qualities among his abstract objects [Frege, by Hale] |
18431 | Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards] |
10535 | Frege's 'objects' are both the referents of proper names, and what predicates are true or false of [Frege, by Dummett] |
3591 | We could never pin down how many beliefs we have [Williams,M] |
3582 | Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible [Williams,M] |
3592 | Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M] |
3579 | Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world [Williams,M] |
3581 | Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M] |
3564 | Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M] |
3595 | What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M] |
3580 | Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M] |
3578 | Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M] |
3576 | Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M] |
3577 | Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M] |
3589 | Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M] |
3590 | Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M] |
3571 | Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M] |
3574 | Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M] |
3586 | Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M] |
3567 | How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M] |
3569 | In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M] |
3573 | Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M] |
3565 | Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M] |
3566 | We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M] |
3594 | Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things [Williams,M] |
3575 | Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity [Williams,M] |
3587 | Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory [Williams,M] |
9839 | Frege equated the concepts under which an object falls with its properties [Frege, by Dummett] |
4973 | As I understand it, a concept is the meaning of a grammatical predicate [Frege] |
9167 | Frege felt that meanings must be public, so they are abstractions rather than mental entities [Frege, by Putnam] |
3588 | Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences [Williams,M] |
4974 | For all the multiplicity of languages, mankind has a common stock of thoughts [Frege] |