60 ideas
10987 | Three traditional names of rules are 'Simplification', 'Addition' and 'Disjunctive Syllogism' [Read] |
11004 | Necessity is provability in S4, and true in all worlds in S5 [Read] |
11018 | There are fuzzy predicates (and sets), and fuzzy quantifiers and modifiers [Read] |
11011 | Same say there are positive, negative and neuter free logics [Read] |
11020 | Realisms like the full Comprehension Principle, that all good concepts determine sets [Read] |
10986 | Not all validity is captured in first-order logic [Read] |
10972 | The non-emptiness of the domain is characteristic of classical logic [Read] |
11024 | Semantics must precede proof in higher-order logics, since they are incomplete [Read] |
10985 | We should exclude second-order logic, precisely because it captures arithmetic [Read] |
10970 | A theory of logical consequence is a conceptual analysis, and a set of validity techniques [Read] |
10984 | Logical consequence isn't just a matter of form; it depends on connections like round-square [Read] |
10973 | A theory is logically closed, which means infinite premisses [Read] |
11007 | Quantifiers are second-order predicates [Read] |
10978 | In second-order logic the higher-order variables range over all the properties of the objects [Read] |
10971 | A logical truth is the conclusion of a valid inference with no premisses [Read] |
10988 | Any first-order theory of sets is inadequate [Read] |
10974 | Compactness is when any consequence of infinite propositions is the consequence of a finite subset [Read] |
10975 | Compactness does not deny that an inference can have infinitely many premisses [Read] |
10977 | Compactness blocks the proof of 'for every n, A(n)' (as the proof would be infinite) [Read] |
10976 | Compactness makes consequence manageable, but restricts expressive power [Read] |
11014 | Self-reference paradoxes seem to arise only when falsity is involved [Read] |
11025 | Infinite cuts and successors seems to suggest an actual infinity there waiting for us [Read] |
10979 | Although second-order arithmetic is incomplete, it can fully model normal arithmetic [Read] |
10980 | Second-order arithmetic covers all properties, ensuring categoricity [Read] |
10997 | Von Neumann numbers are helpful, but don't correctly describe numbers [Read] |
11016 | Would a language without vagueness be usable at all? [Read] |
11019 | Supervaluations say there is a cut-off somewhere, but at no particular place [Read] |
11012 | A 'supervaluation' gives a proposition consistent truth-value for classical assignments [Read] |
11013 | Identities and the Indiscernibility of Identicals don't work with supervaluations [Read] |
18431 | Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards] |
10995 | A haecceity is a set of individual properties, essential to each thing [Read] |
11001 | Equating necessity with truth in every possible world is the S5 conception of necessity [Read] |
10992 | The point of conditionals is to show that one will accept modus ponens [Read] |
10989 | The standard view of conditionals is that they are truth-functional [Read] |
11017 | Some people even claim that conditionals do not express propositions [Read] |
10983 | Knowledge of possible worlds is not causal, but is an ontology entailed by semantics [Read] |
10982 | How can modal Platonists know the truth of a modal proposition? [Read] |
10996 | Actualism is reductionist (to parts of actuality), or moderate realist (accepting real abstractions) [Read] |
10981 | A possible world is a determination of the truth-values of all propositions of a domain [Read] |
11000 | If worlds are concrete, objects can't be present in more than one, and can only have counterparts [Read] |
10998 | The mind abstracts ways things might be, which are nonetheless real [Read] |
11005 | Negative existentials with compositionality make the whole sentence meaningless [Read] |
10966 | A proposition objectifies what a sentence says, as indicative, with secure references [Read] |
3772 | The will, in the beginning, is entirely produced by desire [Mill] |
3769 | With early training, any absurdity or evil may be given the power of conscience [Mill] |
3767 | Motive shows the worth of the agent, but not of the action [Mill] |
3771 | Virtues only have value because they achieve some further end [Mill] |
3768 | Orthodox morality is the only one which feels obligatory [Mill] |
7202 | The English believe in the task of annihilating evil for the victory of good [Nietzsche on Mill] |
5935 | Mill's qualities of pleasure is an admission that there are other good states of mind than pleasure [Ross on Mill] |
3764 | Actions are right if they promote pleasure, wrong if they promote pain [Mill] |
3776 | Utilitarianism only works if everybody has a totally equal right to happiness [Mill] |
3765 | Only pleasure and freedom from pain are desirable as ends [Mill] |
3763 | Ultimate goods such as pleasure can never be proved to be good [Mill] |
3766 | Better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied [Mill] |
3770 | General happiness is only desirable because individuals desire their own happiness [Mill] |
6697 | Moral rules protecting human welfare are more vital than local maxims [Mill] |
3774 | Rights are a matter of justice, not of benevolence [Mill] |
3773 | No individual has the right to receive our benevolence [Mill] |
3775 | A right is a valid claim to society's protection [Mill] |