Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Particulars in Particular Clothing', 'Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo' and 'Towards a Universal Characteristic'

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21 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
1848 We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence [Aquinas]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
1858 The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths [Aquinas]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
1852 For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many [Aquinas]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
19370 'Blind thought' is reasoning without recognition of the ingredients of the reasoning [Leibniz, by Arthur,R]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
19391 We can assign a characteristic number to every single object [Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
19390 Everything is subsumed under number, which is a metaphysical statics of the universe, revealing powers [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
18431 Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
1860 Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge [Aquinas]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
1855 If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
1862 However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas]
1856 Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas]
1853 Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas]
1849 Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas]
1861 The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
1854 We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
1857 We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it [Aquinas]
1846 The will can only want what it thinks is good [Aquinas]
1847 The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means [Aquinas]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
1850 Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
1851 Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
1859 Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas]