Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Intro to G��del's Theorems', 'The Emotions' and 'The Vocation of Man'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


102 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
The personal view can still be objective, so I call sciences 'impersonal', rather than objective [Goldie]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
The need to act produces consciousness, and practical reason is the root of all reason [Fichte]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Sufficient reason makes the transition from the particular to the general [Fichte]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
There cannot be a set theory which is complete [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Second-order arithmetic can prove new sentences of first-order [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
A 'partial function' maps only some elements to another set [Smith,P]
A 'total function' maps every element to one element in another set [Smith,P]
An argument is a 'fixed point' for a function if it is mapped back to itself [Smith,P]
The 'range' of a function is the set of elements in the output set created by the function [Smith,P]
Two functions are the same if they have the same extension [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
The Comprehension Schema says there is a property only had by things satisfying a condition [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
A 'theorem' of a theory is a sentence derived from the axioms using the proof system [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
A 'natural deduction system' has no axioms but many rules [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
No nice theory can define truth for its own language [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
An 'injective' ('one-to-one') function creates a distinct output element from each original [Smith,P]
A 'surjective' ('onto') function creates every element of the output set [Smith,P]
A 'bijective' function has one-to-one correspondence in both directions [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
If everything that a theory proves is true, then it is 'sound' [Smith,P]
Soundness is true axioms and a truth-preserving proof system [Smith,P]
A theory is 'sound' iff every theorem is true (usually from true axioms and truth-preservation) [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
A theory is 'negation complete' if it proves all sentences or their negation [Smith,P]
'Complete' applies both to whole logics, and to theories within them [Smith,P]
A theory is 'negation complete' if one of its sentences or its negation can always be proved [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
Two routes to Incompleteness: semantics of sound/expressible, or syntax of consistency/proof [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 7. Decidability
'Effective' means simple, unintuitive, independent, controlled, dumb, and terminating [Smith,P]
A theory is 'decidable' if all of its sentences could be mechanically proved [Smith,P]
Any consistent, axiomatized, negation-complete formal theory is decidable [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 8. Enumerability
A set is 'enumerable' is all of its elements can result from a natural number function [Smith,P]
A set is 'effectively enumerable' if a computer could eventually list every member [Smith,P]
A finite set of finitely specifiable objects is always effectively enumerable (e.g. primes) [Smith,P]
The set of ordered pairs of natural numbers <i,j> is effectively enumerable [Smith,P]
The thorems of a nice arithmetic can be enumerated, but not the truths (so they're diffferent) [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 9. Expressibility
Being 'expressible' depends on language; being 'capture/represented' depends on axioms and proof system [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
For primes we write (x not= 1 ∧ ∀u∀v(u x v = x → (u = 1 ∨ v = 1))) [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
The reals contain the naturals, but the theory of reals doesn't contain the theory of naturals [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
The truths of arithmetic are just true equations and their universally quantified versions [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
All numbers are related to zero by the ancestral of the successor relation [Smith,P]
The number of Fs is the 'successor' of the Gs if there is a single F that isn't G [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / b. Baby arithmetic
Baby arithmetic covers addition and multiplication, but no general facts about numbers [Smith,P]
Baby Arithmetic is complete, but not very expressive [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / c. Robinson arithmetic
Robinson Arithmetic (Q) is not negation complete [Smith,P]
Robinson Arithmetic 'Q' has basic axioms, quantifiers and first-order logic [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Natural numbers have zero, unique successors, unending, no circling back, and no strays [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / f. Mathematical induction
The logic of arithmetic must quantify over properties of numbers to handle induction [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
Multiplication only generates incompleteness if combined with addition and successor [Smith,P]
Incompleteness results in arithmetic from combining addition and successor with multiplication [Smith,P]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / c. Ancestral relation
The 'ancestral' of a relation is a new relation which creates a long chain of the original relation [Smith,P]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Each object has a precise number of properties, each to a precise degree [Fichte]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
The principle of activity and generation is found in a self-moving basic force [Fichte]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
I am myself, but not the external object; so I only sense myself, and not the object [Fichte]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
Self-consciousness is the basis of knowledge, and knowing something is knowing myself [Fichte]
There is nothing to say about anything which is outside my consciousness [Fichte]
Awareness of reality comes from the free activity of consciousness [Fichte]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
I immediately know myself, and anything beyond that is an inference [Fichte]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Faith is not knowledge; it is a decision of the will [Fichte]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Knowledge can't be its own foundation; there has to be regress of higher and higher authorities [Fichte]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Consciousness has two parts, passively receiving sensation, and actively causing productions [Fichte]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
We know other's emotions by explanation, contagion, empathy, imagination, or sympathy [Goldie]
Empathy and imagining don't ensure sympathy, and sympathy doesn't need them [Goldie]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
We can't know by sight or hearing without realising that we are doing so [Fichte]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
Consciousness of external things is always accompanied by an unnoticed consciousness of self [Fichte]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Forming purposes is absolutely free, and produces something from nothing [Fichte]
The capacity for freedom is above the laws of nature, with its own power of purpose and will [Fichte]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
I want independent control of the fundamental cause of my decisions [Fichte]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Nature contains a fundamental force of thought [Fichte]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
Unlike moods, emotions have specific objects, though the difference is a matter of degree [Goldie]
Emotional intentionality as belief and desire misses out the necessity of feelings [Goldie]
A long lasting and evolving emotion is still seen as a single emotion, such as love [Goldie]
'Having an emotion' differs from 'being emotional' [Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / b. Types of emotion
Some Aborigines have fifteen different words for types of fear [Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Emotional responses can reveal to us our values, which might otherwise remain hidden [Goldie]
If we have a 'feeling towards' an object, that gives the recognition a different content [Goldie]
When actions are performed 'out of' emotion, they appear to be quite different [Goldie]
It is best to see emotions holistically, as embedded in a person's life narrative [Goldie]
If emotions are 'towards' things, they can't be bodily feelings, which lack aboutness [Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / d. Emotional feeling
If reasons are seen impersonally (as just causal), then feelings are an irrelevant extra [Goldie]
We have feelings of which we are hardly aware towards things in the world [Goldie]
An emotion needs episodes of feeling, but not continuously [Goldie]
Moods can focus as emotions, and emotions can blur into moods [Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / e. Basic emotions
Cross-cultural studies of facial expressions suggests seven basic emotions [Goldie]
Emotions are not avocado pears, with a rigid core and changeable surface [Goldie]
A basic emotion is the foundation of a hierarchy, such as anger for types of annoyance [Goldie]
Early Chinese basic emotions: joy, anger, sadness, fear, love, disliking, and liking [Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / f. Emotion and reason
Emotional thought is not rational, but it can be intelligible [Goldie]
Some emotions are direct responses, and neither rational nor irrational [Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Learning an evaluative property like 'dangerous' is also learning an emotion [Goldie]
We call emotions 'passions' because they are not as controlled as we would like [Goldie]
Emotional control is hard, but we are responsible for our emotions over long time periods [Goldie]
Emotions are not easily changed, as new knowledge makes little difference, and akrasia is possible [Goldie]
Emotional control is less concerned with emotional incidents, and more with emotional tendencies [Goldie]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will is awareness of one of our inner natural forces [Fichte]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Akrasia can be either overruling our deliberation, or failing to deliberate [Goldie]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Justifying reasons say you were right; excusing reasons say your act was explicable [Goldie]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
I cannot change the nature which has been determined for me [Fichte]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
The self is, apart from outward behaviour, a drive in your nature [Fichte]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
If life lacks love it becomes destruction [Fichte]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
Character traits are both possession of and lack of dispositions [Goldie]
We over-estimate the role of character traits when explaining behaviour [Goldie]
Psychologists suggest we are muddled about traits, and maybe they should be abandoned [Goldie]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Freedom means making yourself become true to your essential nature [Fichte]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Nature is wholly interconnected, and the tiniest change affects everything [Fichte]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Our capabilities did not all evolve during the hunter gathering period [Goldie]