Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ignorance: a Case for Scepticism', 'The Concept of Mind' and 'Letters to Russell'

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17 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
The main problem of philosophy is what can and cannot be thought and expressed [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories [Ryle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
Atomic facts correspond to true elementary propositions [Wittgenstein]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / e. Dispositions as potential
A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition [Ryle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
The meaning of 'know' does not change from courtroom to living room [Unger]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
No one knows anything, and no one is ever justified or reasonable [Unger]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 4. Demon Scepticism
An evil scientist may give you a momentary life, with totally false memories [Unger]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you [Ryle]
We cannot introspect states of anger or panic [Ryle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think [Ryle]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
Dualism is a category mistake [Ryle]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle]
You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
A thought is mental constituents that relate to reality as words do [Wittgenstein]