Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ignorance: a Case for Scepticism', 'Second Philosophy' and 'Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction''

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8 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Henkin semantics is more plausible for plural logic than for second-order logic [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K]
Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
The meaning of 'know' does not change from courtroom to living room [Unger]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
No one knows anything, and no one is ever justified or reasonable [Unger]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 4. Demon Scepticism
An evil scientist may give you a momentary life, with totally false memories [Unger]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K]