8 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
10594 | Henkin semantics is more plausible for plural logic than for second-order logic [Maddy] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
8724 | The meaning of 'know' does not change from courtroom to living room [Unger] |
8722 | No one knows anything, and no one is ever justified or reasonable [Unger] |
8723 | An evil scientist may give you a momentary life, with totally false memories [Unger] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |