78 ideas
| 14227 | We could refer to tables as 'xs that are arranged tablewise' [Inwagen] |
| 23853 | Truth is not a object we love - it is the radiant manifestation of reality [Weil] |
| 10662 | Mereology is 'nihilistic' (just atoms) or 'universal' (no restrictions on what is 'whole') [Inwagen, by Varzi] |
| 17587 | The 'Law' of Excluded Middle needs all propositions to be definitely true or definitely false [Inwagen] |
| 17558 | Variables are just like pronouns; syntactic explanations get muddled over dummy letters [Inwagen] |
| 17583 | There are no heaps [Inwagen] |
| 23855 | Creation produced a network or web of determinations [Weil] |
| 17578 | I reject talk of 'stuff', and treat it in terms of particles [Inwagen] |
| 17582 | Singular terms can be vague, because they can contain predicates, which can be vague [Inwagen] |
| 17556 | Material objects are in space and time, move, have a surface and mass, and are made of some stuff [Inwagen] |
| 8264 | Maybe table-shaped particles exist, but not tables [Inwagen, by Lowe] |
| 17565 | Nihilism says composition between single things is impossible [Inwagen] |
| 14228 | If there are no tables, but tables are things arranged tablewise, the denial of tables is a contradiction [Liggins on Inwagen] |
| 14468 | Actions by artefacts and natural bodies are disguised cooperations, so we don't need them [Inwagen] |
| 17571 | Every physical thing is either a living organism or a simple [Inwagen] |
| 14064 | If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard] |
| 14066 | A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard] |
| 14067 | Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard] |
| 14069 | We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard] |
| 17562 | The statue and lump seem to share parts, but the statue is not part of the lump [Inwagen] |
| 17574 | If you knead clay you make an infinite series of objects, but they are rearrangements, not creations [Inwagen] |
| 17531 | I assume matter is particulate, made up of 'simples' [Inwagen] |
| 17560 | If contact causes composition, do two colliding balls briefly make one object? [Inwagen] |
| 17561 | If bricks compose a house, that is at least one thing, but it might be many things [Inwagen] |
| 17566 | I think parthood involves causation, and not just a reasonably stable spatial relationship [Inwagen] |
| 14230 | We can deny whole objects but accept parts, by referring to them as plurals within things [Inwagen, by Liggins] |
| 17557 | Special Composition Question: when is a thing part of something? [Inwagen] |
| 14076 | Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard] |
| 17564 | The essence of a star includes the released binding energy which keeps it from collapse [Inwagen] |
| 17575 | The persistence of artifacts always covertly involves intelligent beings [Inwagen] |
| 14077 | Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard] |
| 17577 | When an electron 'leaps' to another orbit, is the new one the same electron? [Inwagen] |
| 17589 | If you reject transitivity of vague identity, there is no Ship of Theseus problem [Inwagen] |
| 14070 | A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard] |
| 17588 | We should talk of the transitivity of 'identity', and of 'definite identity' [Inwagen] |
| 14073 | Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard] |
| 14065 | Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard] |
| 14074 | Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard] |
| 17572 | Actuality proves possibility, but that doesn't explain how it is possible [Inwagen] |
| 14072 | Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard] |
| 14078 | Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard] |
| 14079 | Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard] |
| 17579 | Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations [Inwagen] |
| 17590 | A merely possible object clearly isn't there, so that is a defective notion [Inwagen] |
| 17591 | Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities [Inwagen] |
| 14071 | Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard] |
| 23848 | The aesthete's treatment of beauty as amusement is sacreligious; beauty should nourish [Weil] |
| 23854 | Beauty is the proof of what is good [Weil] |
| 23837 | Respect is our only obligation, which can only be expressed through deeds, not words [Weil] |
| 23844 | The most important human need is to have multiple roots [Weil] |
| 23838 | The need for order stands above all others, and is understood via the other needs [Weil] |
| 23836 | Obligations only bind individuals, not collectives [Weil] |
| 23840 | A citizen should be able to understand the whole of society [Weil] |
| 23843 | Even the poorest should feel collective ownership, and participation in grand display [Weil] |
| 23846 | Culture is an instrument for creating an ongoing succession of teachers [Weil] |
| 23839 | A lifelong head of society should only be a symbol, not a ruler [Weil] |
| 23842 | Party politics in a democracy can't avoid an anti-democratic party [Weil] |
| 23847 | Socialism tends to make a proletariat of the whole population [Weil] |
| 23845 | The capitalists neglect the people and the nation, and even their own interests [Weil] |
| 23841 | By making money the sole human measure, inequality has become universal [Weil] |
| 23835 | People have duties, and only have rights because of the obligations of others to them [Weil] |
| 23852 | To punish people we must ourselves be innocent - but that undermines the desire to punish [Weil] |
| 23850 | The soldier-civilian distinction should be abolished; every citizen is committed to a war [Weil] |
| 23851 | Education is essentially motivation [Weil] |
| 17563 | The strong force pulls, but also pushes apart if nucleons get too close together [Inwagen] |
| 17559 | Is one atom a piece of gold, or is a sizable group of atoms required? [Inwagen] |
| 17580 | One's mental and other life is centred on the brain, unlike any other part of the body [Inwagen] |
| 17586 | At the lower level, life trails off into mere molecular interaction [Inwagen] |
| 17581 | Being part of an organism's life is a matter of degree, and vague [Inwagen] |
| 17567 | A flame is like a life, but not nearly so well individuated [Inwagen] |
| 17568 | A tumour may spread a sort of life, but it is not a life, or an organism [Inwagen] |
| 17569 | Unlike waves, lives are 'jealous'; it is almost impossible for them to overlap [Inwagen] |
| 17570 | The chemical reactions in a human life involve about sixteen elements [Inwagen] |
| 17584 | Some events are only borderline cases of lives [Inwagen] |
| 17576 | If God were to 'reassemble' my atoms of ten years ago, the result would certainly not be me [Inwagen] |
| 17585 | Life is vague at both ends, but could it be totally vague? [Inwagen] |
| 17573 | There is no reason to think that mere existence is a valuable thing [Inwagen] |
| 23849 | Religion should quietly suffuse all human life with its light [Weil] |