68 ideas
1542 | Diogenes of Apollonia was the last natural scientist [Diogenes of Apollonia, by Simplicius] |
14227 | We could refer to tables as 'xs that are arranged tablewise' [Inwagen] |
16477 | Asserting not-p is saying p is false [Russell] |
16484 | There are four experiences that lead us to talk of 'some' things [Russell] |
10662 | Mereology is 'nihilistic' (just atoms) or 'universal' (no restrictions on what is 'whole') [Inwagen, by Varzi] |
16486 | The physical world doesn't need logic, but the mental world does [Russell] |
2947 | Questions wouldn't lead anywhere without the law of excluded middle [Russell] |
17587 | The 'Law' of Excluded Middle needs all propositions to be definitely true or definitely false [Inwagen] |
16480 | A disjunction expresses indecision [Russell] |
16479 | 'Or' expresses hesitation, in a dog at a crossroads, or birds risking grabbing crumbs [Russell] |
16481 | 'Or' expresses a mental state, not something about the world [Russell] |
16487 | Maybe the 'or' used to describe mental states is not the 'or' of logic [Russell] |
16483 | Disjunction may also arise in practice if there is imperfect memory. [Russell] |
17558 | Variables are just like pronouns; syntactic explanations get muddled over dummy letters [Inwagen] |
17583 | There are no heaps [Inwagen] |
16475 | A 'heterological' predicate can't be predicated of itself; so is 'heterological' heterological? Yes=no! [Russell] |
17578 | I reject talk of 'stuff', and treat it in terms of particles [Inwagen] |
17582 | Singular terms can be vague, because they can contain predicates, which can be vague [Inwagen] |
17556 | Material objects are in space and time, move, have a surface and mass, and are made of some stuff [Inwagen] |
8264 | Maybe table-shaped particles exist, but not tables [Inwagen, by Lowe] |
17565 | Nihilism says composition between single things is impossible [Inwagen] |
14228 | If there are no tables, but tables are things arranged tablewise, the denial of tables is a contradiction [Liggins on Inwagen] |
14468 | Actions by artefacts and natural bodies are disguised cooperations, so we don't need them [Inwagen] |
17571 | Every physical thing is either a living organism or a simple [Inwagen] |
17562 | The statue and lump seem to share parts, but the statue is not part of the lump [Inwagen] |
17574 | If you knead clay you make an infinite series of objects, but they are rearrangements, not creations [Inwagen] |
17531 | I assume matter is particulate, made up of 'simples' [Inwagen] |
17560 | If contact causes composition, do two colliding balls briefly make one object? [Inwagen] |
17561 | If bricks compose a house, that is at least one thing, but it might be many things [Inwagen] |
17566 | I think parthood involves causation, and not just a reasonably stable spatial relationship [Inwagen] |
14230 | We can deny whole objects but accept parts, by referring to them as plurals within things [Inwagen, by Liggins] |
17557 | Special Composition Question: when is a thing part of something? [Inwagen] |
17564 | The essence of a star includes the released binding energy which keeps it from collapse [Inwagen] |
17575 | The persistence of artifacts always covertly involves intelligent beings [Inwagen] |
17577 | When an electron 'leaps' to another orbit, is the new one the same electron? [Inwagen] |
17589 | If you reject transitivity of vague identity, there is no Ship of Theseus problem [Inwagen] |
17588 | We should talk of the transitivity of 'identity', and of 'definite identity' [Inwagen] |
489 | Each thing must be in some way unique [Diogenes of Apollonia] |
17572 | Actuality proves possibility, but that doesn't explain how it is possible [Inwagen] |
17579 | Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations [Inwagen] |
17590 | A merely possible object clearly isn't there, so that is a defective notion [Inwagen] |
17591 | Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities [Inwagen] |
16482 | All our knowledge (if verbal) is general, because all sentences contain general words [Russell] |
4758 | Naïve realism leads to physics, but physics then shows that naïve realism is false [Russell] |
483 | Start a thesis with something undisputable [Diogenes of Apollonia] |
1544 | Perception must be an internal matter, because we can fail to perceive when we are preoccupied [Diogenes of Apollonia, by Theophrastus] |
16476 | For simple words, a single experience can show that they are true [Russell] |
16485 | Perception can't prove universal generalisations, so abandon them, or abandon empiricism? [Russell] |
24042 | The older Diogenes said the soul is air, made of the smallest particles [Diogenes of Apollonia] |
16478 | A mother cat is paralysed if equidistant between two needy kittens [Russell] |
5995 | Diogenes of Apollonia offered the first teleological account of cosmology [Diogenes of Apollonia, by Robinson,TM] |
488 | Air is divine, because it is in and around everything, and arranges everything [Diogenes of Apollonia] |
484 | Everything is ultimately a variation of one underlying thing [Diogenes of Apollonia] |
486 | Plants and animals can only come into existence if something fixes their species [Diogenes of Apollonia] |
485 | Things must retain their essential nature during change, or mixing would be impossible [Diogenes of Apollonia] |
17563 | The strong force pulls, but also pushes apart if nucleons get too close together [Inwagen] |
17559 | Is one atom a piece of gold, or is a sizable group of atoms required? [Inwagen] |
17586 | At the lower level, life trails off into mere molecular interaction [Inwagen] |
17568 | A tumour may spread a sort of life, but it is not a life, or an organism [Inwagen] |
17581 | Being part of an organism's life is a matter of degree, and vague [Inwagen] |
17567 | A flame is like a life, but not nearly so well individuated [Inwagen] |
17576 | If God were to 'reassemble' my atoms of ten years ago, the result would certainly not be me [Inwagen] |
17584 | Some events are only borderline cases of lives [Inwagen] |
17569 | Unlike waves, lives are 'jealous'; it is almost impossible for them to overlap [Inwagen] |
17580 | One's mental and other life is centred on the brain, unlike any other part of the body [Inwagen] |
17570 | The chemical reactions in a human life involve about sixteen elements [Inwagen] |
17585 | Life is vague at both ends, but could it be totally vague? [Inwagen] |
17573 | There is no reason to think that mere existence is a valuable thing [Inwagen] |