65 ideas
| 14227 | We could refer to tables as 'xs that are arranged tablewise' [Inwagen] |
| 9570 | In Field's Platonist view, set theory is false because it asserts existence for non-existent things [Field,H, by Chihara] |
| 10662 | Mereology is 'nihilistic' (just atoms) or 'universal' (no restrictions on what is 'whole') [Inwagen, by Varzi] |
| 10260 | Logical consequence is defined by the impossibility of P and ¬q [Field,H, by Shapiro] |
| 17587 | The 'Law' of Excluded Middle needs all propositions to be definitely true or definitely false [Inwagen] |
| 17558 | Variables are just like pronouns; syntactic explanations get muddled over dummy letters [Inwagen] |
| 17583 | There are no heaps [Inwagen] |
| 8958 | In Field's version of science, space-time points replace real numbers [Field,H, by Szabó] |
| 18221 | 'Metric' axioms uses functions, points and numbers; 'synthetic' axioms give facts about space [Field,H] |
| 8757 | The Indispensability Argument is the only serious ground for the existence of mathematical entities [Field,H] |
| 18212 | Nominalists try to only refer to physical objects, or language, or mental constructions [Field,H] |
| 10261 | The application of mathematics only needs its possibility, not its truth [Field,H, by Shapiro] |
| 18218 | Hilbert explains geometry, by non-numerical facts about space [Field,H] |
| 9623 | Field needs a semantical notion of second-order consequence, and that needs sets [Brown,JR on Field,H] |
| 18215 | It seems impossible to explain the idea that the conclusion is contained in the premises [Field,H] |
| 18214 | Mathematics is only empirical as regards which theory is useful [Field,H] |
| 18216 | Abstractions can form useful counterparts to concrete statements [Field,H] |
| 18210 | Why regard standard mathematics as truths, rather than as interesting fictions? [Field,H] |
| 17578 | I reject talk of 'stuff', and treat it in terms of particles [Inwagen] |
| 17582 | Singular terms can be vague, because they can contain predicates, which can be vague [Inwagen] |
| 18211 | You can reduce ontological commitment by expanding the logic [Field,H] |
| 8959 | Field presumes properties can be eliminated from science [Field,H, by Szabó] |
| 17556 | Material objects are in space and time, move, have a surface and mass, and are made of some stuff [Inwagen] |
| 8264 | Maybe table-shaped particles exist, but not tables [Inwagen, by Lowe] |
| 7783 | Bodies, properties, relations, events, numbers, sets and propositions are 'things' if they exist [Lowe] |
| 18213 | Abstract objects are only applicable to the world if they are impure, and connect to the physical [Field,H] |
| 17565 | Nihilism says composition between single things is impossible [Inwagen] |
| 14228 | If there are no tables, but tables are things arranged tablewise, the denial of tables is a contradiction [Liggins on Inwagen] |
| 14468 | Actions by artefacts and natural bodies are disguised cooperations, so we don't need them [Inwagen] |
| 17571 | Every physical thing is either a living organism or a simple [Inwagen] |
| 17562 | The statue and lump seem to share parts, but the statue is not part of the lump [Inwagen] |
| 17574 | If you knead clay you make an infinite series of objects, but they are rearrangements, not creations [Inwagen] |
| 17531 | I assume matter is particulate, made up of 'simples' [Inwagen] |
| 17560 | If contact causes composition, do two colliding balls briefly make one object? [Inwagen] |
| 17561 | If bricks compose a house, that is at least one thing, but it might be many things [Inwagen] |
| 17566 | I think parthood involves causation, and not just a reasonably stable spatial relationship [Inwagen] |
| 14230 | We can deny whole objects but accept parts, by referring to them as plurals within things [Inwagen, by Liggins] |
| 17557 | Special Composition Question: when is a thing part of something? [Inwagen] |
| 17564 | The essence of a star includes the released binding energy which keeps it from collapse [Inwagen] |
| 17575 | The persistence of artifacts always covertly involves intelligent beings [Inwagen] |
| 17577 | When an electron 'leaps' to another orbit, is the new one the same electron? [Inwagen] |
| 17589 | If you reject transitivity of vague identity, there is no Ship of Theseus problem [Inwagen] |
| 17588 | We should talk of the transitivity of 'identity', and of 'definite identity' [Inwagen] |
| 17572 | Actuality proves possibility, but that doesn't explain how it is possible [Inwagen] |
| 17579 | Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations [Inwagen] |
| 17590 | A merely possible object clearly isn't there, so that is a defective notion [Inwagen] |
| 17591 | Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities [Inwagen] |
| 18222 | Beneath every extrinsic explanation there is an intrinsic explanation [Field,H] |
| 9917 | 'Abstract' is unclear, but numbers, functions and sets are clearly abstract [Field,H] |
| 18223 | In theories of fields, space-time points or regions are causal agents [Field,H] |
| 17563 | The strong force pulls, but also pushes apart if nucleons get too close together [Inwagen] |
| 18220 | Both philosophy and physics now make substantivalism more attractive [Field,H] |
| 18219 | Relational space is problematic if you take the idea of a field seriously [Field,H] |
| 17559 | Is one atom a piece of gold, or is a sizable group of atoms required? [Inwagen] |
| 17580 | One's mental and other life is centred on the brain, unlike any other part of the body [Inwagen] |
| 17576 | If God were to 'reassemble' my atoms of ten years ago, the result would certainly not be me [Inwagen] |
| 17585 | Life is vague at both ends, but could it be totally vague? [Inwagen] |
| 17586 | At the lower level, life trails off into mere molecular interaction [Inwagen] |
| 17581 | Being part of an organism's life is a matter of degree, and vague [Inwagen] |
| 17567 | A flame is like a life, but not nearly so well individuated [Inwagen] |
| 17568 | A tumour may spread a sort of life, but it is not a life, or an organism [Inwagen] |
| 17569 | Unlike waves, lives are 'jealous'; it is almost impossible for them to overlap [Inwagen] |
| 17570 | The chemical reactions in a human life involve about sixteen elements [Inwagen] |
| 17584 | Some events are only borderline cases of lives [Inwagen] |
| 17573 | There is no reason to think that mere existence is a valuable thing [Inwagen] |