Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Material Beings', 'De modo distinguendi phaenomena' and 'Timaeus'

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72 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
For relaxation one can consider the world of change, instead of eternal things [Plato]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Philosophy is the supreme gift of the gods to mortals [Plato]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Nothing can come to be without a cause [Plato]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
We could refer to tables as 'xs that are arranged tablewise' [Inwagen]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Mereology is 'nihilistic' (just atoms) or 'universal' (no restrictions on what is 'whole') [Inwagen, by Varzi]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
The 'Law' of Excluded Middle needs all propositions to be definitely true or definitely false [Inwagen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
Variables are just like pronouns; syntactic explanations get muddled over dummy letters [Inwagen]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
There are no heaps [Inwagen]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
Before the existence of the world there must have been being, space and becoming [Plato]
The apprehensions of reason remain unchanging, but reasonless sensation shows mere becoming [Plato]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
I reject talk of 'stuff', and treat it in terms of particles [Inwagen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
If experience is just a dream, it is still real enough if critical reason is never deceived [Leibniz]
The strongest criterion that phenomena show reality is success in prediction [Leibniz]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Singular terms can be vague, because they can contain predicates, which can be vague [Inwagen]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Plato's Forms were seen as part of physics, rather than of metaphysics [Plato, by Annas]
Something will always be well-made if the maker keeps in mind the eternal underlying pattern [Plato]
In addition to the underlying unchanging model and a changing copy of it, there must also be a foundation of all change [Plato]
For knowledge and true opinion to be different there must be Forms; otherwise we are just stuck with sensations [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
The universe is basically an intelligible and unchanging model, and a visible and changing copy of it [Plato]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Material objects are in space and time, move, have a surface and mass, and are made of some stuff [Inwagen]
Maybe table-shaped particles exist, but not tables [Inwagen, by Lowe]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Nihilism says composition between single things is impossible [Inwagen]
If there are no tables, but tables are things arranged tablewise, the denial of tables is a contradiction [Liggins on Inwagen]
Actions by artefacts and natural bodies are disguised cooperations, so we don't need them [Inwagen]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Every physical thing is either a living organism or a simple [Inwagen]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
The statue and lump seem to share parts, but the statue is not part of the lump [Inwagen]
If you knead clay you make an infinite series of objects, but they are rearrangements, not creations [Inwagen]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
I assume matter is particulate, made up of 'simples' [Inwagen]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
If contact causes composition, do two colliding balls briefly make one object? [Inwagen]
If bricks compose a house, that is at least one thing, but it might be many things [Inwagen]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
I think parthood involves causation, and not just a reasonably stable spatial relationship [Inwagen]
We can deny whole objects but accept parts, by referring to them as plurals within things [Inwagen, by Liggins]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Special Composition Question: when is a thing part of something? [Inwagen]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
The essence of a star includes the released binding energy which keeps it from collapse [Inwagen]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
The persistence of artifacts always covertly involves intelligent beings [Inwagen]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
When an electron 'leaps' to another orbit, is the new one the same electron? [Inwagen]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
If you reject transitivity of vague identity, there is no Ship of Theseus problem [Inwagen]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
We should talk of the transitivity of 'identity', and of 'definite identity' [Inwagen]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Actuality proves possibility, but that doesn't explain how it is possible [Inwagen]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations [Inwagen]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
A merely possible object clearly isn't there, so that is a defective notion [Inwagen]
Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities [Inwagen]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
Light, heat and colour are apparent qualities, and so are motion, figure and extension [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Only bird-brained people think astronomy is entirely a matter of evidence [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Plato says the soul is ordered by number [Plato, by Plutarch]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
No one wants to be bad, but bad men result from physical and educational failures, which they do not want or choose [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
Music has harmony like the soul, and serves to reorder disharmony within us [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
One should exercise both the mind and the body, to avoid imbalance [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Everything that takes place naturally is pleasant [Plato]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
Intelligence is the result of rational teaching; true opinion can result from irrational persuasion [Plato]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Bad governments prevent discussion, and discourage the study of virtue [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
The creator of the cosmos had no envy, and so wanted things to be as like himself as possible [Plato]
The cosmos must be unique, because it resembles the creator, who is unique [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
We must consider the four basic shapes as too small to see, only becoming visible in large numbers [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
There are two types of cause, the necessary and the divine [Plato]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 3. Chromodynamics / a. Chromodynamics
The strong force pulls, but also pushes apart if nucleons get too close together [Inwagen]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
Heavenly movements gave us the idea of time, and caused us to inquire about the heavens [Plato]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
Time came into existence with the heavens, so that there will be a time when they can be dissolved [Plato]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
Clearly the world is good, so its maker must have been concerned with the eternal, not with change [Plato]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 3. The Beginning
If the cosmos is an object of perception then it must be continually changing [Plato]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 2. Modern Elements
Is one atom a piece of gold, or is a sizable group of atoms required? [Inwagen]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
One's mental and other life is centred on the brain, unlike any other part of the body [Inwagen]
At the lower level, life trails off into mere molecular interaction [Inwagen]
Being part of an organism's life is a matter of degree, and vague [Inwagen]
A flame is like a life, but not nearly so well individuated [Inwagen]
A tumour may spread a sort of life, but it is not a life, or an organism [Inwagen]
Unlike waves, lives are 'jealous'; it is almost impossible for them to overlap [Inwagen]
The chemical reactions in a human life involve about sixteen elements [Inwagen]
Some events are only borderline cases of lives [Inwagen]
If God were to 'reassemble' my atoms of ten years ago, the result would certainly not be me [Inwagen]
Life is vague at both ends, but could it be totally vague? [Inwagen]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
There is no reason to think that mere existence is a valuable thing [Inwagen]