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All the ideas for 'Material Beings', 'New Scientist articles' and 'The Metaphysics of Causation'

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96 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
We could refer to tables as 'xs that are arranged tablewise' [Inwagen]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Mereology is 'nihilistic' (just atoms) or 'universal' (no restrictions on what is 'whole') [Inwagen, by Varzi]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
The 'Law' of Excluded Middle needs all propositions to be definitely true or definitely false [Inwagen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Logical form can't dictate metaphysics, as it may propose an undesirable property [Schaffer,J]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
Variables are just like pronouns; syntactic explanations get muddled over dummy letters [Inwagen]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
There are no heaps [Inwagen]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Current physics says matter and antimatter should have reduced to light at the big bang [New Sci.]
CP violation shows a decay imbalance in matter and antimatter, leading to matter's dominance [New Sci.]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
I reject talk of 'stuff', and treat it in terms of particles [Inwagen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
There is only one fact - the True [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Singular terms can be vague, because they can contain predicates, which can be vague [Inwagen]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Material objects are in space and time, move, have a surface and mass, and are made of some stuff [Inwagen]
Maybe table-shaped particles exist, but not tables [Inwagen, by Lowe]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Nihilism says composition between single things is impossible [Inwagen]
If there are no tables, but tables are things arranged tablewise, the denial of tables is a contradiction [Liggins on Inwagen]
Actions by artefacts and natural bodies are disguised cooperations, so we don't need them [Inwagen]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Every physical thing is either a living organism or a simple [Inwagen]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
The statue and lump seem to share parts, but the statue is not part of the lump [Inwagen]
If you knead clay you make an infinite series of objects, but they are rearrangements, not creations [Inwagen]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
I assume matter is particulate, made up of 'simples' [Inwagen]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
If contact causes composition, do two colliding balls briefly make one object? [Inwagen]
If bricks compose a house, that is at least one thing, but it might be many things [Inwagen]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
I think parthood involves causation, and not just a reasonably stable spatial relationship [Inwagen]
We can deny whole objects but accept parts, by referring to them as plurals within things [Inwagen, by Liggins]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Special Composition Question: when is a thing part of something? [Inwagen]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
The essence of a star includes the released binding energy which keeps it from collapse [Inwagen]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
The persistence of artifacts always covertly involves intelligent beings [Inwagen]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
When an electron 'leaps' to another orbit, is the new one the same electron? [Inwagen]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
If you reject transitivity of vague identity, there is no Ship of Theseus problem [Inwagen]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
We should talk of the transitivity of 'identity', and of 'definite identity' [Inwagen]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Actuality proves possibility, but that doesn't explain how it is possible [Inwagen]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations [Inwagen]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
A merely possible object clearly isn't there, so that is a defective notion [Inwagen]
Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities [Inwagen]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
A system can infer the structure of the world by making predictions about it [New Sci.]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Neural networks can extract the car-ness of a car, or the chair-ness of a chair [New Sci.]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
No one has yet devised a rationality test [New Sci.]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 7. Intelligence
People can be highly intelligent, yet very stupid [New Sci.]
About a third of variation in human intelligence is environmental [New Sci.]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 1. Psychology
Psychologists measure personality along five dimensions [New Sci.]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
In causation there are three problems of relata, and three metaphysical problems [Schaffer,J]
Causation may not be transitive; the last event may follow from the first, but not be caused by it [Schaffer,J]
There are at least ten theories about causal connections [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Causation transcends nature, because absences can cause things [Schaffer,J]
Causation may not be a process, if a crucial part of the process is 'disconnected' [Schaffer,J]
A causal process needs to be connected to the effect in the right way [Schaffer,J]
Causation can't be a process, because a process needs causation as a primitive [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
At least four rivals have challenged the view that causal direction is time direction [Schaffer,J]
Causal order must be temporal, or else causes could be blocked, and time couldn't be explained [Schaffer,J]
Causal order is not temporal, because of time travel, and simultanous, joint or backward causes [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 6. Causation as primitive
Causation is primitive; it is too intractable and central to be reduced; all explanations require it [Schaffer,J]
If causation is just observables, or part of common sense, or vacuous, it can't be primitive [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
Causation is utterly essential for numerous philosophical explanations [Schaffer,J]
The notion of causation allows understanding of science, without appearing in equations [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
If two different causes are possible in one set of circumstances, causation is primitive [Schaffer,J]
If causation is primitive, it can be experienced in ourselves, or inferred as best explanation [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Events are fairly course-grained (just saying 'hello'), unlike facts (like saying 'hello' loudly) [Schaffer,J]
Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects [Schaffer,J]
One may defend three or four causal relata, as in 'c causes e rather than e*' [Schaffer,J]
If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do [Schaffer,J]
The relata of causation (such as events) need properties as explanation, which need causation! [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis [Schaffer,J]
Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
The actual cause may make an event less likely than a possible more effective cause [Schaffer,J]
All four probability versions of causation may need causation to be primitive [Schaffer,J]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / d. Entropy
Entropy is the only time-asymmetric law, so time may be linked to entropy [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / a. Electrodynamics
Light moves at a constant space-time speed, but its direction is in neither space nor time [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
Quantum states are measured by external time, of unknown origin [New Sci.]
The Schrödinger equation describes the evolution of an object's wave function in Hilbert space [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 3. Chromodynamics / a. Chromodynamics
The strong force pulls, but also pushes apart if nucleons get too close together [Inwagen]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 5. Unified Models / b. String theory
It is impossible for find a model of actuality among the innumerable models in string theory [New Sci.]
String theory needs at least 10 space-time dimensions [New Sci.]
In string theory space-time has a grainy indivisible substructure [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
Hilbert Space is an abstraction representing all possible states of a quantum system [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
Space-time may be a geometrical manifestation of quantum entanglement [New Sci.]
Einstein's merging of time with space has left us confused about the nature of time [New Sci.]
Relativity makes time and space jointly basic; quantum theory splits them, and prioritises time [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Quantum theory relies on a clock outside the system - but where is it located? [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
Entropy is puzzling, so we may need to build new laws which include time directionality [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 7. Black Holes
General relativity predicts black holes, as former massive stars, and as galaxy centres [New Sci.]
Black holes have entropy, but general relativity says they are unstructured, and lack entropy [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 8. Dark Matter
84.5 percent of the universe is made of dark matter [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
We are halfway to synthesising any molecule we want [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 2. Modern Elements
Is one atom a piece of gold, or is a sizable group of atoms required? [Inwagen]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 3. Periodic Table
Chemistry just needs the periodic table, and protons, electrons and neutrinos [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
One's mental and other life is centred on the brain, unlike any other part of the body [Inwagen]
If God were to 'reassemble' my atoms of ten years ago, the result would certainly not be me [Inwagen]
Life is vague at both ends, but could it be totally vague? [Inwagen]
At the lower level, life trails off into mere molecular interaction [Inwagen]
Being part of an organism's life is a matter of degree, and vague [Inwagen]
A flame is like a life, but not nearly so well individuated [Inwagen]
A tumour may spread a sort of life, but it is not a life, or an organism [Inwagen]
Unlike waves, lives are 'jealous'; it is almost impossible for them to overlap [Inwagen]
The chemical reactions in a human life involve about sixteen elements [Inwagen]
Some events are only borderline cases of lives [Inwagen]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
There is no reason to think that mere existence is a valuable thing [Inwagen]