125 ideas
| 8721 | An 'impredicative' definition seems circular, because it uses the term being defined [Friend] |
| 8680 | Classical definitions attempt to refer, but intuitionist/constructivist definitions actually create objects [Friend] |
| 14227 | We could refer to tables as 'xs that are arranged tablewise' [Inwagen] |
| 3678 | Reductio ad absurdum proves an idea by showing that its denial produces contradiction [Friend] |
| 8705 | Anti-realists see truth as our servant, and epistemically contrained [Friend] |
| 8713 | In classical/realist logic the connectives are defined by truth-tables [Friend] |
| 8708 | Double negation elimination is not valid in intuitionist logic [Friend] |
| 8694 | Free logic was developed for fictional or non-existent objects [Friend] |
| 8665 | A 'proper subset' of A contains only members of A, but not all of them [Friend] |
| 8672 | A 'powerset' is all the subsets of a set [Friend] |
| 8677 | Set theory makes a minimum ontological claim, that the empty set exists [Friend] |
| 8666 | Infinite sets correspond one-to-one with a subset [Friend] |
| 8682 | Major set theories differ in their axioms, and also over the additional axioms of choice and infinity [Friend] |
| 10662 | Mereology is 'nihilistic' (just atoms) or 'universal' (no restrictions on what is 'whole') [Inwagen, by Varzi] |
| 17587 | The 'Law' of Excluded Middle needs all propositions to be definitely true or definitely false [Inwagen] |
| 8709 | The law of excluded middle is syntactic; it just says A or not-A, not whether they are true or false [Friend] |
| 17558 | Variables are just like pronouns; syntactic explanations get muddled over dummy letters [Inwagen] |
| 8711 | Intuitionists read the universal quantifier as "we have a procedure for checking every..." [Friend] |
| 8675 | Paradoxes can be solved by talking more loosely of 'classes' instead of 'sets' [Friend] |
| 8674 | The Burali-Forti paradox asks whether the set of all ordinals is itself an ordinal [Friend] |
| 17583 | There are no heaps [Inwagen] |
| 8667 | The 'integers' are the positive and negative natural numbers, plus zero [Friend] |
| 8668 | The 'rational' numbers are those representable as fractions [Friend] |
| 8670 | A number is 'irrational' if it cannot be represented as a fraction [Friend] |
| 8661 | The natural numbers are primitive, and the ordinals are up one level of abstraction [Friend] |
| 8664 | Cardinal numbers answer 'how many?', with the order being irrelevant [Friend] |
| 8671 | The 'real' numbers (rationals and irrationals combined) is the Continuum, which has no gaps [Friend] |
| 8663 | Raising omega to successive powers of omega reveal an infinity of infinities [Friend] |
| 8662 | The first limit ordinal is omega (greater, but without predecessor), and the second is twice-omega [Friend] |
| 8669 | Between any two rational numbers there is an infinite number of rational numbers [Friend] |
| 8676 | Is mathematics based on sets, types, categories, models or topology? [Friend] |
| 8678 | Most mathematical theories can be translated into the language of set theory [Friend] |
| 8701 | The number 8 in isolation from the other numbers is of no interest [Friend] |
| 8702 | In structuralism the number 8 is not quite the same in different structures, only equivalent [Friend] |
| 8699 | Are structures 'ante rem' (before reality), or are they 'in re' (grounded in physics)? [Friend] |
| 8696 | Structuralist says maths concerns concepts about base objects, not base objects themselves [Friend] |
| 8695 | Structuralism focuses on relations, predicates and functions, with objects being inessential [Friend] |
| 8700 | 'In re' structuralism says that the process of abstraction is pattern-spotting [Friend] |
| 8681 | The big problem for platonists is epistemic: how do we perceive, intuit, know or detect mathematical facts? [Friend] |
| 8712 | Mathematics should be treated as true whenever it is indispensable to our best physical theory [Friend] |
| 8716 | Formalism is unconstrained, so cannot indicate importance, or directions for research [Friend] |
| 8706 | Constructivism rejects too much mathematics [Friend] |
| 8707 | Intuitionists typically retain bivalence but reject the law of excluded middle [Friend] |
| 17578 | I reject talk of 'stuff', and treat it in terms of particles [Inwagen] |
| 17582 | Singular terms can be vague, because they can contain predicates, which can be vague [Inwagen] |
| 17556 | Material objects are in space and time, move, have a surface and mass, and are made of some stuff [Inwagen] |
| 8264 | Maybe table-shaped particles exist, but not tables [Inwagen, by Lowe] |
| 8704 | Structuralists call a mathematical 'object' simply a 'place in a structure' [Friend] |
| 17565 | Nihilism says composition between single things is impossible [Inwagen] |
| 14228 | If there are no tables, but tables are things arranged tablewise, the denial of tables is a contradiction [Liggins on Inwagen] |
| 14468 | Actions by artefacts and natural bodies are disguised cooperations, so we don't need them [Inwagen] |
| 17571 | Every physical thing is either a living organism or a simple [Inwagen] |
| 17562 | The statue and lump seem to share parts, but the statue is not part of the lump [Inwagen] |
| 17574 | If you knead clay you make an infinite series of objects, but they are rearrangements, not creations [Inwagen] |
| 17531 | I assume matter is particulate, made up of 'simples' [Inwagen] |
| 17560 | If contact causes composition, do two colliding balls briefly make one object? [Inwagen] |
| 17561 | If bricks compose a house, that is at least one thing, but it might be many things [Inwagen] |
| 17566 | I think parthood involves causation, and not just a reasonably stable spatial relationship [Inwagen] |
| 14230 | We can deny whole objects but accept parts, by referring to them as plurals within things [Inwagen, by Liggins] |
| 17557 | Special Composition Question: when is a thing part of something? [Inwagen] |
| 17564 | The essence of a star includes the released binding energy which keeps it from collapse [Inwagen] |
| 17575 | The persistence of artifacts always covertly involves intelligent beings [Inwagen] |
| 17577 | When an electron 'leaps' to another orbit, is the new one the same electron? [Inwagen] |
| 17589 | If you reject transitivity of vague identity, there is no Ship of Theseus problem [Inwagen] |
| 17588 | We should talk of the transitivity of 'identity', and of 'definite identity' [Inwagen] |
| 17572 | Actuality proves possibility, but that doesn't explain how it is possible [Inwagen] |
| 17579 | Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations [Inwagen] |
| 17590 | A merely possible object clearly isn't there, so that is a defective notion [Inwagen] |
| 17591 | Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities [Inwagen] |
| 8685 | Studying biology presumes the laws of chemistry, and it could never contradict them [Friend] |
| 8688 | Concepts can be presented extensionally (as objects) or intensionally (as a characterization) [Friend] |
| 21167 | Gravity is unusual, in that it always attracts and never repels [New Sci.] |
| 21176 | In the Big Bang general relativity fails, because gravity is too powerful [New Sci.] |
| 21147 | Quantum electrodynamics incorporates special relativity and quantum mechanics [New Sci.] |
| 21155 | Photons have zero rest mass, so virtual photons have infinite range [New Sci.] |
| 21161 | In the standard model all the fundamental force fields merge at extremely high energies [New Sci.] |
| 21146 | Electrons move fast, so are subject to special relativity [New Sci.] |
| 21148 | The strong force is repulsive at short distances, strong at medium, and fades at long [New Sci.] |
| 21151 | Gluons, the particles carrying the strong force, interact because of their colour charge [New Sci.] |
| 21152 | The strong force binds quarks tight, and the nucleus more weakly [New Sci.] |
| 17563 | The strong force pulls, but also pushes apart if nucleons get too close together [Inwagen] |
| 21150 | Three different colours of quark (as in the proton) can cancel out to give no colour [New Sci.] |
| 21143 | Quarks in threes can build hadrons with spin ½ or with spin 3/2 [New Sci.] |
| 21142 | Classifying hadrons revealed two symmetry patterns, produced by three basic elements [New Sci.] |
| 21145 | The four fundamental forces (gravity, electromagnetism, weak and strong) are the effects of particles [New Sci.] |
| 21153 | The weak force explains beta decay, and the change of type by quarks and leptons [New Sci.] |
| 21154 | Three particles enable the weak force: W+ and W- are charged, and Z° is not [New Sci.] |
| 21156 | The weak force particles are heavy, so the force has a short range [New Sci.] |
| 21164 | Why do the charges of the very different proton and electron perfectly match up? [New Sci.] |
| 21170 | The Standard Model cannot explain dark energy, survival of matter, gravity, or force strength [New Sci.] |
| 21140 | Spin is a built-in ration of angular momentum [New Sci.] |
| 21149 | Quarks have red, green or blue colour charge (akin to electric charge) [New Sci.] |
| 21158 | Fermions, with spin ½, are antisocial, and cannot share quantum states [New Sci.] |
| 21165 | Spin is akin to rotation, and is easily measured in a magnetic field [New Sci.] |
| 21157 | Particles are spread out, with wave-like properties, and higher energy shortens the wavelength [New Sci.] |
| 21163 | The mass of protons and neutrinos is mostly binding energy, not the quarks [New Sci.] |
| 21168 | Gravitional mass turns out to be the same as inertial mass [New Sci.] |
| 21138 | Neutrons are slightly heavier than protons, and decay into them by emitting an electron [New Sci.] |
| 21144 | Top, bottom, charm and strange quarks quickly decay into up and down [New Sci.] |
| 21141 | Neutrinos were proposed as the missing energy in neutron beta decay [New Sci.] |
| 21169 | Only neutrinos spin anticlockwise [New Sci.] |
| 21166 | Standard antineutrinos have opposite spin and opposite lepton number [New Sci.] |
| 21171 | The symmetry of unified electromagnetic and weak forces was broken by the Higgs field [New Sci.] |
| 21178 | String theory is now part of 11-dimensional M-Theory, involving p-branes [New Sci.] |
| 21179 | Supersymmetric string theory can be expressed using loop quantum gravity [New Sci.] |
| 21175 | String theory might be tested by colliding strings to make bigger 'stringballs' [New Sci.] |
| 21177 | String theory offers a quantum theory of gravity, by describing the graviton [New Sci.] |
| 21162 | Only supersymmetry offers to incorporate gravity into the scheme [New Sci.] |
| 21159 | Supersymmetry has extra heavy bosons and heavy fermions [New Sci.] |
| 21173 | Supersymmetry says particles and superpartners were unities, but then split [New Sci.] |
| 21172 | The evidence for supersymmetry keeps failing to appear [New Sci.] |
| 21160 | The Higgs field means even low energy space is not empty [New Sci.] |
| 21174 | Dark matter must have mass, to produce gravity, and no electric charge, to not reflect light [New Sci.] |
| 17559 | Is one atom a piece of gold, or is a sizable group of atoms required? [Inwagen] |
| 17586 | At the lower level, life trails off into mere molecular interaction [Inwagen] |
| 17567 | A flame is like a life, but not nearly so well individuated [Inwagen] |
| 17576 | If God were to 'reassemble' my atoms of ten years ago, the result would certainly not be me [Inwagen] |
| 17568 | A tumour may spread a sort of life, but it is not a life, or an organism [Inwagen] |
| 17581 | Being part of an organism's life is a matter of degree, and vague [Inwagen] |
| 17584 | Some events are only borderline cases of lives [Inwagen] |
| 17569 | Unlike waves, lives are 'jealous'; it is almost impossible for them to overlap [Inwagen] |
| 17580 | One's mental and other life is centred on the brain, unlike any other part of the body [Inwagen] |
| 17570 | The chemical reactions in a human life involve about sixteen elements [Inwagen] |
| 17585 | Life is vague at both ends, but could it be totally vague? [Inwagen] |
| 17573 | There is no reason to think that mere existence is a valuable thing [Inwagen] |