87 ideas
343 | The unexamined life is not worth living for men [Socrates] |
14227 | We could refer to tables as 'xs that are arranged tablewise' [Inwagen] |
18395 | Sets are mereological sums of the singletons of their members [Lewis, by Armstrong] |
15496 | We can build set theory on singletons: classes are then fusions of subclasses, membership is the singleton [Lewis] |
15500 | Classes divide into subclasses in many ways, but into members in only one way [Lewis] |
15499 | A subclass of a subclass is itself a subclass; a member of a member is not in general a member [Lewis] |
15498 | We can accept the null set, but there is no null class of anything [Lewis] |
15502 | There are four main reasons for asserting that there is an empty set [Lewis] |
15503 | We needn't accept this speck of nothingness, this black hole in the fabric of Reality! [Lewis] |
15497 | We can replace the membership relation with the member-singleton relation (plus mereology) [Lewis] |
15506 | If we don't understand the singleton, then we don't understand classes [Lewis] |
15511 | If singleton membership is external, why is an object a member of one rather than another? [Lewis] |
15513 | Maybe singletons have a structure, of a thing and a lasso? [Lewis] |
15507 | Set theory has some unofficial axioms, generalisations about how to understand it [Lewis] |
10191 | Set theory reduces to a mereological theory with singletons as the only atoms [Lewis, by MacBride] |
15508 | If singletons are where their members are, then so are all sets [Lewis] |
15514 | A huge part of Reality is only accepted as existing if you have accepted set theory [Lewis] |
15523 | Set theory isn't innocent; it generates infinities from a single thing; but mathematics needs it [Lewis] |
10662 | Mereology is 'nihilistic' (just atoms) or 'universal' (no restrictions on what is 'whole') [Inwagen, by Varzi] |
17587 | The 'Law' of Excluded Middle needs all propositions to be definitely true or definitely false [Inwagen] |
17558 | Variables are just like pronouns; syntactic explanations get muddled over dummy letters [Inwagen] |
15525 | Plural quantification lacks a complete axiom system [Lewis] |
15518 | I like plural quantification, but am not convinced of its connection with second-order logic [Lewis] |
17583 | There are no heaps [Inwagen] |
15524 | Zermelo's model of arithmetic is distinctive because it rests on a primitive of set theory [Lewis] |
15517 | Giving up classes means giving up successful mathematics because of dubious philosophy [Lewis] |
15515 | To be a structuralist, you quantify over relations [Lewis] |
15520 | Existence doesn't come in degrees; once asserted, it can't then be qualified [Lewis] |
15501 | We have no idea of a third sort of thing, that isn't an individual, a class, or their mixture [Lewis] |
15504 | Atomless gunk is an individual whose parts all have further proper parts [Lewis] |
17578 | I reject talk of 'stuff', and treat it in terms of particles [Inwagen] |
17582 | Singular terms can be vague, because they can contain predicates, which can be vague [Inwagen] |
15516 | A property is any class of possibilia [Lewis] |
17556 | Material objects are in space and time, move, have a surface and mass, and are made of some stuff [Inwagen] |
8264 | Maybe table-shaped particles exist, but not tables [Inwagen, by Lowe] |
17565 | Nihilism says composition between single things is impossible [Inwagen] |
14228 | If there are no tables, but tables are things arranged tablewise, the denial of tables is a contradiction [Liggins on Inwagen] |
14468 | Actions by artefacts and natural bodies are disguised cooperations, so we don't need them [Inwagen] |
17571 | Every physical thing is either a living organism or a simple [Inwagen] |
17562 | The statue and lump seem to share parts, but the statue is not part of the lump [Inwagen] |
17574 | If you knead clay you make an infinite series of objects, but they are rearrangements, not creations [Inwagen] |
17531 | I assume matter is particulate, made up of 'simples' [Inwagen] |
17560 | If contact causes composition, do two colliding balls briefly make one object? [Inwagen] |
14748 | The many are many and the one is one, so they can't be identical [Lewis] |
6129 | Lewis affirms 'composition as identity' - that an object is no more than its parts [Lewis, by Merricks] |
17561 | If bricks compose a house, that is at least one thing, but it might be many things [Inwagen] |
17566 | I think parthood involves causation, and not just a reasonably stable spatial relationship [Inwagen] |
14230 | We can deny whole objects but accept parts, by referring to them as plurals within things [Inwagen, by Liggins] |
15519 | Trout-turkeys exist, despite lacking cohesion, natural joints and united causal power [Lewis] |
15521 | Given cats, a fusion of cats adds nothing further to reality [Lewis] |
15522 | The one has different truths from the many; it is one rather than many, one rather than six [Lewis] |
15512 | In mereology no two things consist of the same atoms [Lewis] |
10566 | Lewis prefers giving up singletons to giving up sums [Lewis, by Fine,K] |
14244 | Lewis only uses fusions to create unities, but fusions notoriously flatten our distinctions [Oliver/Smiley on Lewis] |
10660 | A commitment to cat-fusions is not a further commitment; it is them and they are it [Lewis] |
17557 | Special Composition Question: when is a thing part of something? [Inwagen] |
17564 | The essence of a star includes the released binding energy which keeps it from collapse [Inwagen] |
17575 | The persistence of artifacts always covertly involves intelligent beings [Inwagen] |
17577 | When an electron 'leaps' to another orbit, is the new one the same electron? [Inwagen] |
17589 | If you reject transitivity of vague identity, there is no Ship of Theseus problem [Inwagen] |
17588 | We should talk of the transitivity of 'identity', and of 'definite identity' [Inwagen] |
17572 | Actuality proves possibility, but that doesn't explain how it is possible [Inwagen] |
17579 | Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations [Inwagen] |
17590 | A merely possible object clearly isn't there, so that is a defective notion [Inwagen] |
17591 | Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities [Inwagen] |
15509 | Some say qualities are parts of things - as repeatable universals, or as particulars [Lewis] |
339 | Men fear death as a great evil when it may be a great blessing [Socrates] |
344 | If death is like a night of dreamless sleep, such nights are very pleasant [Socrates] |
2 | We should not even harm someone who harms us [Socrates] |
345 | A good man cannot be harmed, either in life or in death [Socrates] |
346 | One ought not to return a wrong or injury to any person, whatever the provocation [Socrates] |
341 | Wealth is good if it is accompanied by virtue [Socrates] |
347 | Will I stand up against the law, simply because I have been unjustly judged? [Socrates] |
17563 | The strong force pulls, but also pushes apart if nucleons get too close together [Inwagen] |
17559 | Is one atom a piece of gold, or is a sizable group of atoms required? [Inwagen] |
17570 | The chemical reactions in a human life involve about sixteen elements [Inwagen] |
17576 | If God were to 'reassemble' my atoms of ten years ago, the result would certainly not be me [Inwagen] |
17569 | Unlike waves, lives are 'jealous'; it is almost impossible for them to overlap [Inwagen] |
17567 | A flame is like a life, but not nearly so well individuated [Inwagen] |
17568 | A tumour may spread a sort of life, but it is not a life, or an organism [Inwagen] |
17580 | One's mental and other life is centred on the brain, unlike any other part of the body [Inwagen] |
17581 | Being part of an organism's life is a matter of degree, and vague [Inwagen] |
17584 | Some events are only borderline cases of lives [Inwagen] |
17585 | Life is vague at both ends, but could it be totally vague? [Inwagen] |
17586 | At the lower level, life trails off into mere molecular interaction [Inwagen] |
17573 | There is no reason to think that mere existence is a valuable thing [Inwagen] |
338 | Socrates is accused of denying the gods, saying sun is stone and moon is earth [Socrates, by Plato] |