69 ideas
162 | Can we understand an individual soul without knowing the soul in general? [Plato] |
160 | The highest ability in man is the ability to discuss unity and plurality in the nature of things [Plato] |
166 | A speaker should be able to divide a subject, right down to the limits of divisibility [Plato] |
14227 | We could refer to tables as 'xs that are arranged tablewise' [Inwagen] |
10662 | Mereology is 'nihilistic' (just atoms) or 'universal' (no restrictions on what is 'whole') [Inwagen, by Varzi] |
17587 | The 'Law' of Excluded Middle needs all propositions to be definitely true or definitely false [Inwagen] |
17558 | Variables are just like pronouns; syntactic explanations get muddled over dummy letters [Inwagen] |
17583 | There are no heaps [Inwagen] |
17578 | I reject talk of 'stuff', and treat it in terms of particles [Inwagen] |
7953 | Reasoning needs to cut nature accurately at the joints [Plato] |
17582 | Singular terms can be vague, because they can contain predicates, which can be vague [Inwagen] |
16121 | I revere anyone who can discern a single thing that encompasses many things [Plato] |
153 | It takes a person to understand, by using universals, and by using reason to create a unity out of sense-impressions [Plato] |
154 | We would have an overpowering love of knowledge if we had a pure idea of it - as with the other Forms [Plato] |
17556 | Material objects are in space and time, move, have a surface and mass, and are made of some stuff [Inwagen] |
8264 | Maybe table-shaped particles exist, but not tables [Inwagen, by Lowe] |
17565 | Nihilism says composition between single things is impossible [Inwagen] |
14228 | If there are no tables, but tables are things arranged tablewise, the denial of tables is a contradiction [Liggins on Inwagen] |
14468 | Actions by artefacts and natural bodies are disguised cooperations, so we don't need them [Inwagen] |
17571 | Every physical thing is either a living organism or a simple [Inwagen] |
17562 | The statue and lump seem to share parts, but the statue is not part of the lump [Inwagen] |
17574 | If you knead clay you make an infinite series of objects, but they are rearrangements, not creations [Inwagen] |
17531 | I assume matter is particulate, made up of 'simples' [Inwagen] |
17560 | If contact causes composition, do two colliding balls briefly make one object? [Inwagen] |
17561 | If bricks compose a house, that is at least one thing, but it might be many things [Inwagen] |
17566 | I think parthood involves causation, and not just a reasonably stable spatial relationship [Inwagen] |
14230 | We can deny whole objects but accept parts, by referring to them as plurals within things [Inwagen, by Liggins] |
17557 | Special Composition Question: when is a thing part of something? [Inwagen] |
17564 | The essence of a star includes the released binding energy which keeps it from collapse [Inwagen] |
17575 | The persistence of artifacts always covertly involves intelligent beings [Inwagen] |
17577 | When an electron 'leaps' to another orbit, is the new one the same electron? [Inwagen] |
17589 | If you reject transitivity of vague identity, there is no Ship of Theseus problem [Inwagen] |
17588 | We should talk of the transitivity of 'identity', and of 'definite identity' [Inwagen] |
17572 | Actuality proves possibility, but that doesn't explain how it is possible [Inwagen] |
17579 | Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations [Inwagen] |
17590 | A merely possible object clearly isn't there, so that is a defective notion [Inwagen] |
17591 | Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities [Inwagen] |
151 | True knowledge is of the reality behind sense experience [Plato] |
165 | If the apparent facts strongly conflict with probability, it is in everyone's interests to suppress the facts [Plato] |
17093 | Causation produces productive mechanisms; to understand the world, understand these mechanisms [Salmon] |
17492 | Salmon's interaction mechanisms needn't be regular, or involving any systems [Glennan on Salmon] |
9296 | The soul is self-motion [Plato] |
23997 | Plato saw emotions and appetites as wild horses, in need of taming [Plato, by Goldie] |
159 | Only a good philosopher can be a good speaker [Plato] |
5946 | 'Phaedrus' pioneers the notion of philosophical rhetoric [Lawson-Tancred on Plato] |
158 | An excellent speech seems to imply a knowledge of the truth in the mind of the speaker [Plato] |
155 | Beauty is the clearest and most lovely of the Forms [Plato] |
143 | The two ruling human principles are the natural desire for pleasure, and an acquired love of virtue [Plato] |
157 | Most pleasure is release from pain, and is therefore not worthwhile [Plato] |
144 | Reason impels us towards excellence, which teaches us self-control [Plato] |
156 | Bad people are never really friends with one another [Plato] |
17563 | The strong force pulls, but also pushes apart if nucleons get too close together [Inwagen] |
148 | If the prime origin is destroyed, it will not come into being again out of anything [Plato] |
17559 | Is one atom a piece of gold, or is a sizable group of atoms required? [Inwagen] |
17586 | At the lower level, life trails off into mere molecular interaction [Inwagen] |
17568 | A tumour may spread a sort of life, but it is not a life, or an organism [Inwagen] |
17581 | Being part of an organism's life is a matter of degree, and vague [Inwagen] |
17567 | A flame is like a life, but not nearly so well individuated [Inwagen] |
17576 | If God were to 'reassemble' my atoms of ten years ago, the result would certainly not be me [Inwagen] |
17584 | Some events are only borderline cases of lives [Inwagen] |
17569 | Unlike waves, lives are 'jealous'; it is almost impossible for them to overlap [Inwagen] |
17580 | One's mental and other life is centred on the brain, unlike any other part of the body [Inwagen] |
17570 | The chemical reactions in a human life involve about sixteen elements [Inwagen] |
17585 | Life is vague at both ends, but could it be totally vague? [Inwagen] |
152 | The mind of God is fully satisfied and happy with a vision of reality and truth [Plato] |
17573 | There is no reason to think that mere existence is a valuable thing [Inwagen] |
150 | We cannot conceive of God, so we have to think of Him as an immortal version of ourselves [Plato] |
149 | There isn't a single reason for positing the existence of immortal beings [Plato] |
146 | Soul is always in motion, so it must be self-moving and immortal [Plato] |