Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Fragments of Pherecydes', 'Letters to Des Bosses' and 'Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula'

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27 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
12780 We can grasp the wisdom of God a priori [Leibniz]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
15134 The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
15141 Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson]
15140 The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
15131 If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
15135 If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson]
15139 Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
18492 Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
15136 Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
15138 Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
12774 Without a substantial chain to link monads, they would just be coordinated dreams [Leibniz]
12777 Monads do not make a unity unless a substantial chain is added to them [Leibniz]
12782 Monads control nothing outside of themselves [Leibniz]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
15137 If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
12778 There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite [Leibniz]
12783 Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
12775 Things seem to be unified if we see duration, position, interaction and connection [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
12776 Every substance is alive [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
12753 A substantial bond of powers is needed to unite composites, in addition to monads [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
12781 A composite substance is a mere aggregate if its essence is just its parts [Leibniz]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
12779 There is a reason why not every possible thing exists [Leibniz]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
15142 Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
12785 Truth is mutually agreed perception [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
22745 Pherecydes said the first principle and element is earth [Pherecydes, by Sext.Empiricus]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
15133 A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
12784 Allow no more miracles than are necessary [Leibniz]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
5883 Pherecydes was the first to say that the soul is eternal [Pherecydes, by Cicero]