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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Social Contract (tr Cress)' and 'The Possibility of Metaphysics'

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155 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is the mapping of possibilities [Lowe, by Mumford]
Science needs metaphysics to weed out its presuppositions [Lowe, by Hofweber]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Only metaphysics can decide whether identity survives through change [Lowe]
Metaphysics tells us what there could be, rather than what there is [Lowe]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Both nature and reason require that everything has a cause [Rousseau]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
How can a theory of meaning show the ontological commitments of two paraphrases of one idea? [Lowe]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
Maybe facts are just true propositions [Lowe]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
One-to-one correspondence would need countable, individuable items [Lowe]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
A set is a 'number of things', not a 'collection', because nothing actually collects the members [Lowe]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
I don't believe in the empty set, because (lacking members) it lacks identity-conditions [Lowe]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
It is better if the existential quantifier refers to 'something', rather than a 'thing' which needs individuation [Lowe]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
Numbers are universals, being sets whose instances are sets of appropriate cardinality [Lowe]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
Simple counting is more basic than spotting that one-to-one correlation makes sets equinumerous [Lowe]
Fs and Gs are identical in number if they one-to-one correlate with one another [Lowe]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Sets are instances of numbers (rather than 'collections'); numbers explain sets, not vice versa [Lowe]
If 2 is a particular, then adding particulars to themselves does nothing, and 2+2=2 [Lowe]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Does the existence of numbers matter, in the way space, time and persons do? [Lowe]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
All possible worlds contain abstracta (e.g. numbers), which means they contain concrete objects [Lowe]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Perhaps possession of causal power is the hallmark of existence (and a reason to deny the void) [Lowe]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Heraclitus says change is new creation, and Spinoza that it is just phases of the one substance [Lowe]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects [Lowe]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations [Lowe]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents? [Lowe]
Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations [Lowe]
The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents [Lowe]
It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast? [Lowe]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / e. Facts rejected
Facts are needed for truth-making and causation, but they seem to lack identity criteria [Lowe]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs [Lowe]
Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them [Lowe]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
Ontological categories are not natural kinds: the latter can only be distinguished using the former [Lowe]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
The top division of categories is either abstract/concrete, or universal/particular, or necessary/contingent [Lowe]
Lowe divides things into universals and particulars, then kinds and properties, and abstract/concrete [Lowe, by Westerhoff]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Is 'the Thames is broad in London' relational, or adverbial, or segmental? [Lowe]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
I prefer 'modes' to 'tropes', because it emphasises their dependence [Lowe]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
Why cannot a trope float off and join another bundle? [Lowe]
Tropes cannot have clear identity-conditions, so they are not objects [Lowe]
How can tropes depend on objects for their identity, if objects are just bundles of tropes? [Lowe]
Does a ball snug in plaster have one trope, or two which coincide? [Lowe]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Sortal terms for universals involve a substance, whereas adjectival terms do not [Lowe]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Real universals are needed to explain laws of nature [Lowe]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables [Lowe]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
To be an object at all requires identity-conditions [Lowe]
Our commitment to the existence of objects should depend on their explanatory value [Lowe]
Objects are entities with full identity-conditions, but there are entities other than objects [Lowe]
Perhaps concrete objects are entities which are in space-time and subject to causality [Lowe]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
An object is an entity which has identity-conditions [Lowe]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Some things (such as electrons) can be countable, while lacking proper identity [Lowe]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
Criteria of identity cannot individuate objects, because they are shared among different types [Lowe]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
Diversity of two tigers is their difference in space-time; difference of matter is a consequence [Lowe]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Individuation principles identify what kind it is; identity criteria distinguish items of the same kind [Lowe]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
A 'substance' is an object which doesn't depend for existence on other objects [Lowe]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
The identity of composite objects isn't fixed by original composition, because how do you identify the origin? [Lowe]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
An object 'endures' if it is always wholly present, and 'perdures' if different parts exist at different times [Lowe]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
How can you identify temporal parts of tomatoes without referring to tomatoes? [Lowe]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it [Lowe]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
One view is that two objects of the same type are only distinguished by differing in matter [Lowe]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
'Conceptual' necessity is narrow logical necessity, true because of concepts and logical laws [Lowe]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity is logical necessity 'broadly construed' [Lowe, by Lynch/Glasgow]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical necessity can be 'strict' (laws), or 'narrow' (laws and definitions), or 'broad' (all logical worlds) [Lowe]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
The metaphysically possible is what acceptable principles and categories will permit [Lowe]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Does every abstract possible world exist in every possible world? [Lowe]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
While space may just be appearance, time and change can't be, because the appearances change [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
Properties or qualities are essentially adjectival, not objectual [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
The idea that Cartesian souls are made of some ghostly 'immaterial' stuff is quite unwarranted [Lowe]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
Abstractions are non-spatial, or dependent, or derived from concepts [Lowe]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
You can think of a direction without a line, but a direction existing with no lines is inconceivable [Lowe]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Without freedom of will actions lack moral significance [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
Natural mankind is too fragmented for states of peace, or of war and enmity [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Rousseau assumes that laws need a people united by custom and tradition [Rousseau, by Wolff,J]
The act of becoming 'a people' is the real foundation of society [Rousseau]
To overcome obstacles, people must unite their forces into a single unified power [Rousseau]
Human nature changes among a people, into a moral and partial existence [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / b. State population
A state must be big enough to preserve itself, but small enough to be governable [Rousseau]
Too much land is a struggle, producing defensive war; too little makes dependence, and offensive war [Rousseau]
If the state enlarges, the creators of the general will become less individually powerful [Rousseau]
If the population is larger, the government needs to be more powerful [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / a. Natural freedom
Man is born free, and he is everywhere in chains [Rousseau]
No man has any natural authority over his fellows [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
A state's purpose is liberty and equality - liberty for strength, and equality for liberty [Rousseau]
The greatest social good comes down to freedom and equality [Rousseau]
The measure of a successful state is increase in its population [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / a. Sovereignty
The sovereignty does not appoint the leaders [Rousseau]
Rousseau insists that popular sovereignty needs a means of expressing consent [Rousseau, by Oksala]
Sovereignty is the exercise of the general will, which can never be delegated [Rousseau]
Just as people control their limbs, the general-will state has total control of its members [Rousseau]
Political laws are fundamental, as they firmly organise the state - but they could still be changed [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / b. Natural authority
Force can only dominate if it is seen as a right, and obedience as a duty [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
The social order is a sacred right, but based on covenants, not nature [Rousseau]
The government is instituted by a law, not by a contract [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
The social pact is the total subjection of individuals to the general will [Rousseau]
We need a protective association which unites forces, but retains individual freedom [Rousseau]
To foreign powers a state is seen as a simple individual [Rousseau]
The act of association commits citizens to the state, and the state to its citizens [Rousseau]
Citizens must ultimately for forced to accept the general will (so freedom is compulsory!) [Rousseau]
Individual citizens still retain a private will, which may be contrary to the general will [Rousseau]
The general will is common interest; the will of all is the sum of individual desires [Rousseau]
The general will is always right, but the will of all can err, because it includes private interests [Rousseau]
If the state contains associations there are fewer opinions, undermining the general will [Rousseau]
If a large knowledgeable population votes in isolation, their many choices will have good results [Rousseau]
The general will changes its nature when it focuses on particulars [Rousseau]
The general will is always good, but sometimes misunderstood [Rousseau]
Laws are authentic acts of the general will [Rousseau]
Assemblies must always confirm the form of government, and the current administration [Rousseau]
The more unanimous the assembly, the stronger the general will becomes [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Citizens should be independent of each other, and very dependent on the state [Rousseau]
A citizen is a subject who is also sovereign [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
The flourishing of arts and letters is too much admired [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
Ancient monarchs were kings of peoples; modern monarchs more cleverly rule a land [Rousseau]
The highest officers under a monarchy are normally useless; the public could choose much better [Rousseau]
Hereditary monarchy is easier, but can lead to dreadful monarchs [Rousseau]
Attempts to train future kings don't usually work, and the best have been unprepared [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
Natural aristocracy is primitive, and hereditary is dreadful, but elective aristocracy is best [Rousseau]
Natural aristocracy is primitive, hereditary is bad, and elective aristocracy is the best [Rousseau]
Large states need a nobility to fill the gap between a single prince and the people [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
Law makers and law implementers should be separate [Rousseau]
The state has a legislature and an executive, just like the will and physical power in a person [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / c. Executive
I call the executive power the 'government', which is the 'prince' - a single person, or a group [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / d. Size of government
Large populations needs stronger control, which means power should be concentrated [Rousseau]
Democracy for small states, aristocracy for intermediate, monarchy for large [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
If inhabitants are widely dispersed, organising a revolt is much more difficult [Rousseau]
The state is not bound to leave civil authority to its leaders [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
If the sovereign entrusts government to at least half the citizens, that is 'democracy' [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
Democratic elections are dangerous intervals in government [Rousseau]
Silence of the people implies their consent [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
The English are actually slaves in between elections [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / e. Democratic minorities
Minorities only accept majority-voting because of a prior unanimous agreement [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Democracy leads to internal strife, as people struggle to maintain or change ways of ruling [Rousseau]
When ministers change the state changes, because they always reverse policies [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 10. Theocracy
In early theocracies the god was the king, and there were as many gods as nations [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Sometimes full liberty is only possible at the expense of some complete enslavement [Rousseau]
We can never assume that the son of a slave is a slave [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Appetite alone is slavery, and self-prescribed laws are freedom [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
The social compact imposes conventional equality of rights on people who may start unequally [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
No citizen should be rich enough to buy another, and none so poor as forced to sell himself [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 3. Alienating rights
If we all give up all of our rights together to the community, we will always support one another [Rousseau]
In society man loses natural liberty, but gains a right to civil liberty and property [Rousseau]
We alienate to society only what society needs - but society judges that, not us [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Private property must always be subordinate to ownership by the whole community [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
The state ensures liberty, so civil law separates citizens, and binds them to the state [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Natural justice, without sanctions, benefits the wicked, who exploit it [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
We accept the death penalty to prevent assassinations, so we must submit to it if necessary [Rousseau]
A trial proves that a criminal has broken the social treaty, and is no longer a member of the state [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / c. Deterrence of crime
Only people who are actually dangerous should be executed, even as an example [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
War gives no right to inflict more destruction than is necessary for victory [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / c. Combatants
Wars are between States, not people, and the individuals are enemies by accident [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
By separating theological and political systems, Jesus caused divisions in the state [Rousseau]
Civil religion needs one supreme god, an afterlife, justice, and the sanctity of the social contract [Rousseau]
All religions should be tolerated, if they tolerate each other, and support citizenship [Rousseau]
Every society has a religion as its base [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 4. Taxation
The amount of taxation doesn't matter, if it quickly circulates back to the citizens [Rousseau]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
Pherecydes said the first principle and element is earth [Pherecydes, by Sext.Empiricus]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
To cite facts as the elements in causation is to confuse states of affairs with states of objects [Lowe]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
Points are limits of parts of space, so parts of space cannot be aggregates of them [Lowe]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
A tyrant exploits Christians because they don't value this life, and are made to be slaves [Rousseau]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Pherecydes was the first to say that the soul is eternal [Pherecydes, by Cicero]