20 ideas
16985 | Possible worlds allowed the application of set-theoretic models to modal logic [Kripke] |
16982 | A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke] |
15200 | How could change consist of a conjunction of changeless facts? [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin] |
14761 | Change is not just having two different qualities at different points in some series [McTaggart] |
16981 | With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke] |
4942 | The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke] |
16984 | I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc. [Kripke] |
9385 | The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth [Kripke] |
4943 | Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.." [Kripke] |
16983 | Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things [Kripke] |
22745 | Pherecydes said the first principle and element is earth [Pherecydes, by Sext.Empiricus] |
2608 | For McTaggart time is seen either as fixed, or as relative to events [McTaggart, by Ayer] |
22936 | A-series time positions are contradictory, and yet all events occupy all of them! [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin] |
4231 | Time involves change, only the A-series explains change, but it involves contradictions, so time is unreal [McTaggart, by Lowe] |
8591 | There could be no time if nothing changed [McTaggart] |
22935 | The B-series can be inferred from the A-series, but not the other way round [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin] |
7802 | A-series uses past, present and future; B-series uses 'before' and 'after' [McTaggart, by Girle] |
4230 | A-series expressions place things in time, and their truth varies; B-series is relative, and always true [McTaggart, by Lowe] |
15199 | The B-series must depend on the A-series, because change must be explained [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin] |
5883 | Pherecydes was the first to say that the soul is eternal [Pherecydes, by Cicero] |