51 ideas
18902 | Correspondence theories can't tell you what truths correspond to [Davidson] |
18074 | Intuitionists rely on assertability instead of truth, but assertability relies on truth [Kitcher] |
6298 | Kitcher says maths is an idealisation of the world, and our operations in dealing with it [Kitcher, by Resnik] |
12392 | Mathematical a priorism is conceptualist, constructivist or realist [Kitcher] |
18078 | The interest or beauty of mathematics is when it uses current knowledge to advance undestanding [Kitcher] |
12426 | The 'beauty' or 'interest' of mathematics is just explanatory power [Kitcher] |
12395 | Real numbers stand to measurement as natural numbers stand to counting [Kitcher] |
12425 | Complex numbers were only accepted when a geometrical model for them was found [Kitcher] |
18071 | A one-operation is the segregation of a single object [Kitcher] |
18066 | The old view is that mathematics is useful in the world because it describes the world [Kitcher] |
18083 | With infinitesimals, you divide by the time, then set the time to zero [Kitcher] |
18061 | Mathematical intuition is not the type platonism needs [Kitcher] |
12420 | If mathematics comes through intuition, that is either inexplicable, or too subjective [Kitcher] |
12393 | Intuition is no basis for securing a priori knowledge, because it is fallible [Kitcher] |
12387 | Mathematical knowledge arises from basic perception [Kitcher] |
12412 | My constructivism is mathematics as an idealization of collecting and ordering objects [Kitcher] |
18065 | We derive limited mathematics from ordinary things, and erect powerful theories on their basis [Kitcher] |
18077 | The defenders of complex numbers had to show that they could be expressed in physical terms [Kitcher] |
12423 | Analyticity avoids abstract entities, but can there be truth without reference? [Kitcher] |
18069 | Arithmetic is an idealizing theory [Kitcher] |
18068 | Arithmetic is made true by the world, but is also made true by our constructions [Kitcher] |
18070 | We develop a language for correlations, and use it to perform higher level operations [Kitcher] |
18072 | Constructivism is ontological (that it is the work of an agent) and epistemological (knowable a priori) [Kitcher] |
18063 | Conceptualists say we know mathematics a priori by possessing mathematical concepts [Kitcher] |
18064 | If meaning makes mathematics true, you still need to say what the meanings refer to [Kitcher] |
6472 | Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell] |
6473 | Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws [Russell] |
18067 | Abstract objects were a bad way of explaining the structure in mathematics [Kitcher] |
6465 | We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell] |
6471 | The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell] |
6466 | Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities [Russell] |
12390 | A priori knowledge comes from available a priori warrants that produce truth [Kitcher] |
12418 | In long mathematical proofs we can't remember the original a priori basis [Kitcher] |
12389 | Knowledge is a priori if the experience giving you the concepts thus gives you the knowledge [Kitcher] |
12416 | We have some self-knowledge a priori, such as knowledge of our own existence [Kitcher] |
6467 | No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once [Russell] |
6483 | Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
8244 | Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science [Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari] |
6462 | Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics [Russell] |
6463 | Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do [Russell] |
6464 | Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject [Russell] |
6459 | We do not know whether sense-data exist as objects when they are not data [Russell] |
6460 | 'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind [Russell] |
6461 | Ungiven sense-data can no more exist than unmarried husbands [Russell] |
6458 | Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell] |
6469 | Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell] |
12413 | A 'warrant' is a process which ensures that a true belief is knowledge [Kitcher] |
20473 | If experiential can defeat a belief, then its justification depends on the defeater's absence [Kitcher, by Casullo] |
18075 | Idealisation trades off accuracy for simplicity, in varying degrees [Kitcher] |
6470 | Matter is the limit of appearances as distance from the object diminishes [Russell] |
6468 | There is 'private space', and there is also the 'space of perspectives' [Russell] |