59 ideas
| 22496 | Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime [Foot] |
| 6095 | The business of metaphysics is to describe the world [Russell] |
| 6106 | Reducing entities and premisses makes error less likely [Russell] |
| 5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
| 6090 | Facts make propositions true or false, and are expressed by whole sentences [Russell] |
| 18348 | Not only atomic truths, but also general and negative truths, have truth-makers [Russell, by Rami] |
| 6103 | Normally a class with only one member is a problem, because the class and the member are identical [Russell] |
| 6092 | In a logically perfect language, there will be just one word for every simple object [Russell] |
| 6101 | Romulus does not occur in the proposition 'Romulus did not exist' [Russell] |
| 6102 | You can understand 'author of Waverley', but to understand 'Scott' you must know who it applies to [Russell] |
| 10423 | There are a set of criteria for pinning down a logically proper name [Russell, by Sainsbury] |
| 7744 | Treat description using quantifiers, and treat proper names as descriptions [Russell, by McCullogh] |
| 10426 | A name has got to name something or it is not a name [Russell] |
| 6104 | Numbers are classes of classes, and hence fictions of fictions [Russell] |
| 21708 | Russell's new logical atomist was of particulars, universals and facts (not platonic propositions) [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| 19051 | Russell's atomic facts are actually compounds, and his true logical atoms are sense data [Russell, by Quine] |
| 6089 | Logical atomism aims at logical atoms as the last residue of analysis [Russell] |
| 6100 | Once you have enumerated all the atomic facts, there is a further fact that those are all the facts [Russell] |
| 6105 | Logical atoms aims to get down to ultimate simples, with their own unique reality [Russell] |
| 21709 | You can't name all the facts, so they are not real, but are what propositions assert [Russell] |
| 18376 | Russell asserts atomic, existential, negative and general facts [Russell, by Armstrong] |
| 5465 | Modern trope theory tries, like logical atomism, to reduce things to elementary states [Russell, by Ellis] |
| 6060 | 'Existence' means that a propositional function is sometimes true [Russell] |
| 2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
| 16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
| 6099 | Modal terms are properties of propositional functions, not of propositions [Russell] |
| 6098 | Perception goes straight to the fact, and not through the proposition [Russell] |
| 2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
| 5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
| 5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
| 5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
| 5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
| 5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
| 5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
| 5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
| 5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
| 6097 | The theory of error seems to need the existence of the non-existent [Russell] |
| 9022 | Russell uses 'propositional function' to refer to both predicates and to attributes [Quine on Russell] |
| 6091 | Propositions don't name facts, because each fact corresponds to a proposition and its negation [Russell] |
| 21702 | In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts' [Russell, by Quine] |
| 6094 | An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions [Russell] |
| 6096 | I no longer believe in propositions, especially concerning falsehoods [Russell] |
| 21712 | I know longer believe in shadowy things like 'that today is Wednesday' when it is actually Tuesday [Russell] |
| 2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |
| 6093 | The names in a logically perfect language would be private, and could not be shared [Russell] |
| 23694 | All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot] |
| 23686 | Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
| 23693 | Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot] |
| 23687 | Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
| 22492 | Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot] |
| 22493 | Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot] |
| 22491 | Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot] |
| 22497 | Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life [Foot] |
| 22498 | Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends [Foot] |
| 23695 | Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent [Foot] |
| 22499 | We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life [Foot] |
| 22495 | Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory [Foot] |
| 22502 | Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment [Foot] |
| 6119 | You can discuss 'God exists', so 'God' is a description, not a name [Russell] |