13 ideas
| 4187 | 'There is nothing without a reason why it should be rather than not be' (a generalisation of 'Why?') [Schopenhauer] |
| 4192 | All necessity arises from causation, which is conditioned; there is no absolute or unconditioned necessity [Schopenhauer] |
| 19440 | How do you know you have conceived a thing deeply enough to assess its possibility? [Vaidya] |
| 4190 | All understanding is an immediate apprehension of the causal relation [Schopenhauer] |
| 4191 | What we know in ourselves is not a knower but a will [Schopenhauer] |
| 21368 | The knot of the world is the use of 'I' to refer to both willing and knowing [Schopenhauer] |
| 22465 | We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen [Foot] |
| 22466 | We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences [Foot] |
| 22467 | Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it [Foot] |
| 22470 | A good moral system benefits its participants, and so demands reciprocity [Foot] |
| 22468 | Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them [Foot] |
| 22469 | Some virtues imply rules, and others concern attachment [Foot] |
| 4189 | Time may be defined as the possibility of mutually exclusive conditions of the same thing [Schopenhauer] |