Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Natural Goodness', 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism' and 'Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals'

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59 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime [Foot]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
The business of metaphysics is to describe the world [Russell]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Reducing entities and premisses makes error less likely [Russell]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Facts make propositions true or false, and are expressed by whole sentences [Russell]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths
Not only atomic truths, but also general and negative truths, have truth-makers [Russell, by Rami]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
Normally a class with only one member is a problem, because the class and the member are identical [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
In a logically perfect language, there will be just one word for every simple object [Russell]
Romulus does not occur in the proposition 'Romulus did not exist' [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
You can understand 'author of Waverley', but to understand 'Scott' you must know who it applies to [Russell]
There are a set of criteria for pinning down a logically proper name [Russell, by Sainsbury]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Treat description using quantifiers, and treat proper names as descriptions [Russell, by McCullogh]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
A name has got to name something or it is not a name [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
Numbers are classes of classes, and hence fictions of fictions [Russell]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
Russell's new logical atomist was of particulars, universals and facts (not platonic propositions) [Russell, by Linsky,B]
Russell's atomic facts are actually compounds, and his true logical atoms are sense data [Russell, by Quine]
Logical atomism aims at logical atoms as the last residue of analysis [Russell]
Once you have enumerated all the atomic facts, there is a further fact that those are all the facts [Russell]
Logical atoms aims to get down to ultimate simples, with their own unique reality [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
You can't name all the facts, so they are not real, but are what propositions assert [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
Russell asserts atomic, existential, negative and general facts [Russell, by Armstrong]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
Modern trope theory tries, like logical atomism, to reduce things to elementary states [Russell, by Ellis]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
'Existence' means that a propositional function is sometimes true [Russell]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Modal terms are properties of propositional functions, not of propositions [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Perception goes straight to the fact, and not through the proposition [Russell]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
The theory of error seems to need the existence of the non-existent [Russell]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Russell uses 'propositional function' to refer to both predicates and to attributes [Quine on Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Propositions don't name facts, because each fact corresponds to a proposition and its negation [Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts' [Russell, by Quine]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions [Russell]
I no longer believe in propositions, especially concerning falsehoods [Russell]
I know longer believe in shadowy things like 'that today is Wednesday' when it is actually Tuesday [Russell]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
The names in a logically perfect language would be private, and could not be shared [Russell]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot]
Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
The human heart has a natural concern for public good [Hume]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends [Foot]
Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life [Foot]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
No moral theory is of any use if it doesn't serve the interests of the individual concerned [Hume]
Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent [Foot]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Personal Merit is the possession of useful or agreeable mental qualities [Hume]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Justice only exists to support society [Hume]
If we all naturally had everything we could ever desire, the virtue of justice would be irrelevant [Hume]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Moral philosophy aims to show us our duty [Hume]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
Conclusions of reason do not affect our emotions or decisions to act [Hume]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Virtue just requires careful calculation and a preference for the greater happiness [Hume]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
No one would cause pain to a complete stranger who happened to be passing [Hume]
Nature makes private affections come first, because public concerns are spread too thinly [Hume]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment [Foot]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The safety of the people is the supreme law [Hume]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
Society prefers helpful lies to harmful truth [Hume]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
If you equalise possessions, people's talents will make them unequal again [Hume]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
You can discuss 'God exists', so 'God' is a description, not a name [Russell]