40 ideas
| 22496 | Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime [Foot] |
| 19275 | You cannot understand what exists without understanding possibility and necessity [Hale] |
| 19291 | A canonical defintion specifies the type of thing, and what distinguish this specimen [Hale] |
| 19297 | The two Barcan principles are easily proved in fairly basic modal logic [Hale] |
| 19301 | With a negative free logic, we can dispense with the Barcan formulae [Hale] |
| 19296 | If second-order variables range over sets, those are just objects; properties and relations aren't sets [Hale] |
| 19289 | Maybe conventionalism applies to meaning, but not to the truth of propositions expressed [Hale] |
| 19298 | Unlike axiom proofs, natural deduction proofs needn't focus on logical truths and theorems [Hale] |
| 19295 | Add Hume's principle to logic, to get numbers; arithmetic truths rest on the nature of the numbers [Hale] |
| 19281 | Interesting supervenience must characterise the base quite differently from what supervenes on it [Hale] |
| 19278 | There is no gap between a fact that p, and it is true that p; so we only have the truth-condtions for p [Hale] |
| 19302 | If a chair could be made of slightly different material, that could lead to big changes [Hale] |
| 19290 | Absolute necessities are necessarily necessary [Hale] |
| 19286 | 'Absolute necessity' is when there is no restriction on the things which necessitate p [Hale] |
| 19288 | Logical and metaphysical necessities differ in their vocabulary, and their underlying entities [Hale] |
| 19285 | Logical necessity is something which is true, no matter what else is the case [Hale] |
| 19287 | Maybe each type of logic has its own necessity, gradually becoming broader [Hale] |
| 19282 | It seems that we cannot show that modal facts depend on non-modal facts [Hale] |
| 19276 | The big challenge for essentialist views of modality is things having necessary existence [Hale] |
| 19293 | Essentialism doesn't explain necessity reductively; it explains all necessities in terms of a few basic natures [Hale] |
| 19294 | If necessity derives from essences, how do we explain the necessary existence of essences? [Hale] |
| 19279 | What are these worlds, that being true in all of them makes something necessary? [Hale] |
| 19299 | Possible worlds make every proposition true or false, which endorses classical logic [Hale] |
| 9354 | Why should necessities only be knowable a priori? That Hesperus is Phosporus is known empirically [Devitt] |
| 9353 | We explain away a priori knowledge, not as directly empirical, but as indirectly holistically empirical [Devitt] |
| 9356 | The idea of the a priori is so obscure that it won't explain anything [Devitt] |
| 19300 | The molecules may explain the water, but they are not what 'water' means [Hale] |
| 23694 | All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot] |
| 23686 | Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
| 23693 | Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot] |
| 23687 | Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
| 22492 | Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot] |
| 22493 | Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot] |
| 22491 | Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot] |
| 22497 | Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life [Foot] |
| 22498 | Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends [Foot] |
| 23695 | Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent [Foot] |
| 22499 | We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life [Foot] |
| 22495 | Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory [Foot] |
| 22502 | Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment [Foot] |