Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Natural Goodness', 'Papancasudani' and 'In Defense of Essentialism'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

24 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
22496 Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime [Foot]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
23694 All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
23686 Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
23693 Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
23687 Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
22493 Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot]
22492 Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
22491 Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
22497 Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life [Foot]
22498 Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends [Foot]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
23695 Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent [Foot]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
22499 We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
22495 Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory [Foot]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
22502 Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment [Foot]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 1. Causing Death
7907 Human killing is worse if the victim is virtuous [Buddhaghosa]