Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Morality, Action, and Outcome', 'The Fixation of Belief' and 'Some Remarks on Essentialism'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Essentialism says some of a thing's properties are necessary, and could not be absent [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
The difficulty in essentialism is deciding the grounds for rating an attribute as essential [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essentialism is said to be unintelligible, because relative, if necessary truths are all analytic [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
An act of ostension doesn't seem to need a 'sort' of thing, even of a very broad kind [Cartwright,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce]
A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce]
We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce]
We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen [Foot]
We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences [Foot]
Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it [Foot]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
A good moral system benefits its participants, and so demands reciprocity [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Some virtues imply rules, and others concern attachment [Foot]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / d. Pascal's Wager
If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce]