30 ideas
10405 | In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer] |
4975 | A thought can be split in many ways, so that different parts appear as subject or predicate [Frege] |
10407 | Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer] |
9949 | There is the concept, the object falling under it, and the extension (a set, which is also an object) [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
18995 | Frege mistakenly takes existence to be a property of concepts, instead of being about things [Frege, by Yablo] |
10421 | Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer] |
10410 | Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer] |
10416 | Can properties have parts? [Swoyer] |
10399 | If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer] |
10417 | There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer] |
10317 | It is unclear whether Frege included qualities among his abstract objects [Frege, by Hale] |
10413 | The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer] |
10402 | Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer] |
10400 | Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer] |
10403 | If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer] |
10535 | Frege's 'objects' are both the referents of proper names, and what predicates are true or false of [Frege, by Dummett] |
10406 | One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer] |
10404 | Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer] |
10408 | Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer] |
9839 | Frege equated the concepts under which an object falls with its properties [Frege, by Dummett] |
10409 | Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer] |
4973 | As I understand it, a concept is the meaning of a grammatical predicate [Frege] |
9167 | Frege felt that meanings must be public, so they are abstractions rather than mental entities [Frege, by Putnam] |
10401 | The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer] |
4974 | For all the multiplicity of languages, mankind has a common stock of thoughts [Frege] |
10420 | Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer] |
22481 | There is no restitution after a dilemma, if it only involved the agent, or just needed an explanation [Foot, by PG] |
22482 | I can't understand how someone can be necessarily wrong whatever he does [Foot] |
10412 | If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer] |
10411 | Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer] |