Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Morality as system of hypothetical imps.', 'Subjective View: sec qualities and indexicals' and 'Are Freedom and Equality Compatible?'

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29 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
22427 To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience [McGinn]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
22413 Being red simply consists in looking red [McGinn]
22415 Relativity means differing secondary perceptions are not real disagreements [McGinn]
22416 Phenomenalism is correct for secondary qualities, so scepticism is there impossible [McGinn]
22422 Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities [McGinn]
22428 You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square [McGinn]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
22414 You don't need to know how a square thing looks or feels to understand squareness [McGinn]
22423 Touch doesn't provide direct experience of primary qualities, because touch feels temperature [McGinn]
22426 We can perceive objectively, because primary qualities are not mind-created [McGinn]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
22412 Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences [McGinn]
22421 Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception? [McGinn]
22424 Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise [McGinn]
22425 The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings [McGinn]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
7629 We see objects 'directly' by representing them [McGinn]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
22420 The indexical perspective is subjective, incorrigible and constant [McGinn]
18410 Indexical thought is in relation to my self-consciousness [McGinn]
22417 Indexicals do not figure in theories of physics, because they are not explanatory causes [McGinn]
18402 Indexical concepts are indispensable, as we need them for the power to act [McGinn]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
22418 I can know indexical truths a priori, unlike their non-indexical paraphrases [McGinn]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
22392 Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable' [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
23685 Reason is not a motivator of morality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
23691 Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent [Foot]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
22391 Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system [Foot]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
22389 Morality no more consists of categorical imperatives than etiquette does [Foot]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
21733 The right-wing conception of freedom is based on the idea of self-ownership [Cohen,GA]
21739 Plenty of people have self-ownership, but still lack autonomy [Cohen,GA]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
21736 It is doubtful whether any private property was originally acquired legitimately [Cohen,GA]
21734 It is plausible that no one has an initial right to own land and natural resources [Cohen,GA]
21735 Every thing which is now private started out as unowned [Cohen,GA]