14 ideas
| 14231 | We should always apply someone's theory of meaning to their own utterances [Liggins] |
| 14232 | We normally formalise 'There are Fs' with singular quantification and predication, but this may be wrong [Liggins] |
| 14233 | Nihilists needn't deny parts - they can just say that some of the xs are among the ys [Liggins] |
| 7301 | The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7302 | Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7303 | If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7300 | An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7299 | Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7297 | My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 22445 | Morality shows murder is wrong, but not what counts as a murder [Foot] |
| 22444 | A moral system must deal with the dangers and benefits of life [Foot] |
| 22447 | Saying something 'just is' right or wrong creates an illusion of fact and objectivity [Foot] |
| 22448 | We sometimes just use the word 'should' to impose a rule of conduct on someone [Foot] |
| 22446 | In the case of something lacking independence, calling it a human being is a matter of choice [Foot] |