35 ideas
| 11159 | My account shows how the concept works, rather than giving an analysis [Fine,K] |
| 11157 | Modern philosophy has largely abandoned real definitions, apart from sortals [Fine,K] |
| 11171 | Defining a term and giving the essence of an object don't just resemble - they are the same [Fine,K] |
| 7949 | Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C] |
| 11151 | An object is dependent if its essence prevents it from existing without some other object [Fine,K] |
| 11152 | Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K] |
| 11161 | Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is' [Fine,K] |
| 11160 | Simple modal essentialism refers to necessary properties of an object [Fine,K] |
| 11158 | Essentialist claims can be formulated more clearly with quantified modal logic [Fine,K] |
| 11167 | Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 16537 | Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Fine,K, by Lowe] |
| 11163 | The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 11164 | It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold [Fine,K] |
| 10935 | An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami] |
| 10936 | Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition' [Fine,K, by Rami] |
| 11165 | If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence [Fine,K] |
| 11166 | The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity [Fine,K] |
| 11169 | Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts [Fine,K] |
| 11162 | Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K] |
| 11168 | Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects [Fine,K] |
| 11170 | Analytic truth may only be true in virtue of the meanings of certain terms [Fine,K] |
| 11172 | The meaning of 'bachelor' is irrelevant to the meaning of 'unmarried man' [Fine,K] |
| 20020 | If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20072 | We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
| 20045 | Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson] |
| 3395 | Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim] |
| 23734 | The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M] |
| 23737 | Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson] |
| 20075 | Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
| 6664 | Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe] |
| 22445 | Morality shows murder is wrong, but not what counts as a murder [Foot] |
| 22444 | A moral system must deal with the dangers and benefits of life [Foot] |
| 22447 | Saying something 'just is' right or wrong creates an illusion of fact and objectivity [Foot] |
| 22448 | We sometimes just use the word 'should' to impose a rule of conduct on someone [Foot] |
| 22446 | In the case of something lacking independence, calling it a human being is a matter of choice [Foot] |