17 ideas
| 5662 | Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer] |
| 5664 | Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects [Ayer] |
| 5668 | People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body [Ayer] |
| 5661 | We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences [Ayer] |
| 5665 | Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences [Ayer] |
| 5666 | Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress [Ayer] |
| 5669 | Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them [Ayer] |
| 22384 | A 'double effect' is a foreseen but not desired side-effect, which may be forgivable [Foot] |
| 22385 | The doctrine of double effect can excuse an outcome because it wasn't directly intended [Foot] |
| 22386 | Double effect says foreseeing you will kill someone is not the same as intending it [Foot] |
| 22387 | Without double effect, bad men can make us do evil by threatening something worse [Foot] |
| 22388 | Double effect seems to rely on a distinction between what we do and what we allow [Foot] |
| 23366 | We see nature's will in the ways all people are the same [Epictetus] |
| 4022 | Epictetus says we should console others for misfortune, but not be moved by pity [Epictetus, by Taylor,C] |
| 23365 | If someone is weeping, you should sympathise and help, but not share his suffering [Epictetus] |
| 23368 | Perhaps we should persuade culprits that their punishment is just? [Epictetus] |
| 22383 | Abortion is puzzling because we do and don't want the unborn child to have rights [Foot] |