Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?', 'Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues' and 'fragments/reports'

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15 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching [Sosa]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism [Sosa]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa]
Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
Alcmaeon was the first to say the brain is central to thinking [Alcmaeon, by Staden, von]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
Non-cognitivists give the conditions of use of moral sentences as facts about the speaker [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Moral arguments are grounded in human facts [Foot]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
Soul must be immortal, since it continually moves, like the heavens [Alcmaeon, by Aristotle]