Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Morality as system of hypothetical imps.', 'Conditionals' and 'On Carnap's Views on Ontology'

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18 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
22153 Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
14352 '¬', '&', and 'v' are truth functions: the truth of the compound is fixed by the truth of the components [Jackson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
19485 Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
19486 We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
14360 Possible worlds for subjunctives (and dispositions), and no-truth for indicatives? [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
14353 Modus ponens requires that A→B is F when A is T and B is F [Jackson]
14354 When A and B have the same truth value, A→B is true, because A→A is a logical truth [Jackson]
14355 (A&B)→A is a logical truth, even if antecedent false and consequent true, so it is T if A is F and B is T [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
14358 In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated [Jackson]
14359 Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions [Jackson]
14357 Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
14356 We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance [Jackson]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
19487 Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
22392 Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable' [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
23685 Reason is not a motivator of morality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
23691 Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent [Foot]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
22391 Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system [Foot]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
22389 Morality no more consists of categorical imperatives than etiquette does [Foot]