11 ideas
| 23248 | Early empiricists said reason was just a useless concept introduced by philosophers [Galen, by Frede,M] |
| 23111 | If we say that freedom depends on rationality, the irrational actions are not free [Sidgwick] |
| 22465 | We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen [Foot] |
| 22466 | We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences [Foot] |
| 22467 | Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it [Foot] |
| 23059 | Self-interest is not rational, if the self is just a succession of memories and behaviour [Sidgwick, by Gray] |
| 22470 | A good moral system benefits its participants, and so demands reciprocity [Foot] |
| 22468 | Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them [Foot] |
| 22469 | Some virtues imply rules, and others concern attachment [Foot] |
| 4129 | It is self-evident (from the point of view of the Universe) that no individual has more importance than another [Sidgwick] |
| 20588 | Sidwick argues for utilitarian institutions, rather than actions [Sidgwick, by Tuckness/Wolf] |