Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Natural Goodness', 'Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous' and 'Philosophy and the Nature of Language'

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62 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime [Foot]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
If 'Queen of England' does not refer if there is no queen, its meaning can't refer if there is one [Cooper,DE]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
I do not believe in the existence of anything, if I see no reason to believe it [Berkeley]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
I know that nothing inconsistent can exist [Berkeley]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
If some peoples do not have categories like time or cause, they can't be essential features of rationality [Cooper,DE]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
There is no other substance, in a strict sense, than spirit [Berkeley]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
A thing is shown to be impossible if a contradiction is demonstrated within its definition [Berkeley]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
Since our ideas vary when the real things are said to be unchanged, they cannot be true copies [Berkeley]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
If existence is perceived directly, by which sense; if indirectly, how is it inferred from direct perception? [Berkeley]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Sensible objects are just sets of sensible qualities [Berkeley]
Berkeley did not deny material things; he merely said they must be defined through sensations [Berkeley, by Ayer]
Berkeley needed a phenomenalist account of the self, as well as of material things [Ayer on Berkeley]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / c. Empirical idealism
'To be is to be perceived' is a simple confusion of experience with its objects [Russell on Berkeley]
For Berkelely, reality is ideas and a community of minds, including God's [Berkeley, by Grayling]
Time is measured by the succession of ideas in our minds [Berkeley]
There is no such thing as 'material substance' [Berkeley]
I conceive a tree in my mind, but I cannot prove that its existence can be conceived outside a mind [Berkeley]
There is nothing in nature which needs the concept of matter to explain it [Berkeley]
Perceptions are ideas, and ideas exist in the mind, so objects only exist in the mind [Berkeley]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Primary qualities (such as shape, solidity, mass) are held to really exist, unlike secondary qualities [Berkeley]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
A mite would see its own foot as large, though we would see it as tiny [Berkeley]
The apparent size of an object varies with its distance away, so that can't be a property of the object [Berkeley]
'Solidity' is either not a sensible quality at all, or it is clearly relative to our senses [Berkeley]
Distance is not directly perceived by sight [Berkeley]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Immediate objects of perception, which some treat as appearances, I treat as the real things themselves [Berkeley]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Real things and imaginary or dreamed things differ because the latter are much fainter [Berkeley]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
Geometry is originally perceived by senses, and so is not purely intellectual [Berkeley]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
It is possible that we could perceive everything as we do now, but nothing actually existed. [Berkeley]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
A hot hand and a cold hand will have different experiences in the same tepid water [Berkeley]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 5. Language Relativism
If it is claimed that language correlates with culture, we must be able to identify the two independently [Cooper,DE]
A person's language doesn't prove their concepts, but how are concepts deduced apart from language? [Cooper,DE]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
Experience tells me that other minds exist independently from my own [Berkeley]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Many sentences set up dispositions which are irrelevant to the meanings of the sentences [Cooper,DE]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
How can that which is unthinking be a cause of thought? [Berkeley]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
Berkeley probably used 'idea' to mean both the act of apprehension and the thing apprehended [Russell on Berkeley]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
I can meaningfully speculate that humans may have experiences currently impossible for us [Cooper,DE]
The verification principle itself seems neither analytic nor verifiable [Cooper,DE]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
Most people know how to use the word "Amen", but they do not know what it means [Cooper,DE]
'How now brown cow?' is used for elocution, but this says nothing about its meaning [Cooper,DE]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Any thesis about reference is also a thesis about what exists to be referred to [Cooper,DE]
Reference need not be a hit-or-miss affair [Cooper,DE]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
If predicates name things, that reduces every sentence to a mere list of names [Cooper,DE]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
An analytic truth is one which becomes a logical truth when some synonyms have been replaced [Cooper,DE]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Immorality is not in the action, but in the deviation of the will from moral law [Berkeley]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot]
Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life [Foot]
Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends [Foot]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent [Foot]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory [Foot]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment [Foot]
28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
There must be a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by him [Berkeley]
There must be a God, because I and my ideas are not independent [Berkeley]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
It has been proved that creation is the workmanship of God, from its beauty and usefulness [Berkeley]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil
People are responsible because they have limited power, though this ultimately derives from God [Berkeley]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil
If sin is not just physical, we don't consider God the origin of sin because he causes physical events [Berkeley]